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Abstract 
 
A general interest in risk perception and the current implementation project of integrated 
operations (IO) at the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) laid the foundations for this thesis. 
Preceding effort from research teams and pilot projects has explored the effects and changes 
of IO to make sure the implementation of generation one and generation two will be safe. 
Still, the use of IO is expected to influence and possibly alter the risk picture and risk 
assessments of petroleum production. The RIO-project was initiated to develop new 
knowledge and frameworks for reasoning, as a basis and platform for risk assessment in 
relation to petroleum production in the environment of IO. On a request from the RIO-project 
this thesis explores how actors from different expert groups, in relation to petroleum 
production, perceive risk and risk management of IO. The findings are intended to generate 
ideas and information that can be utilised for suggestions on how employees in the petroleum 
industry could avoid or manage problems due to risk of IO. To gain insight on the subject 
matter a qualitative, semi-structured interview was conducted. The study consists of 13 
respondents that were divided into four expert groups on the basis of their current place of 
work: industry members, researchers, supervisors and risk analysis consultants. The research 
findings were categorised and analysed according to some methods from Grounded Theory. 
The findings can be used to map out how these 13 actors in the petroleum sector perceive risk 
and risk management in relation to IO. It is further concluded that their risk perception differs 
and seems to be independent of the distribution across expert groups. However, as the study 
comprises relatively few respondents the results are insufficient to infer anything about the 
common perception of risk in the sector or in the expert groups. However, the results are 
significant and important in that they shed light on current beliefs about risk, especially in 
relation to the transition between generation 1 and generation 2. 
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1. Introduction 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Field of Interest 
The need to understand and the desire to manage risk have been the centre of attention in 
numerous debates since the end of the Second World War (Breakwell, 2007). Risk studies 
derived from the practical needs of industrialised societies to regulate technology and to 
protect the public and employees from natural and technological hazards (Golding, 1992). In 
the Norwegian petroleum sector major changes are currently taking place due to the recent, 
ongoing process of implementing and utilising integrated operations (IO) (OLF, 2007). The 
advantages of IO are believed to be immense. For instance, it will create new ways of 
organising work, managing work processes and increased automation, such as closer 
collaboration between offshore and onshore sites and collaboration across company and 
geographical borders (OLF, 2006b). However, concerns about IO altering the risk picture and 
creating new risk management challenges also exist (Grøtan, Størseth, and Albrechtsen, 
2009). These worries might be legitimate as on 22nd April 2010 the BBC announced that the 
oilrig Deepwater Horizon sunk in the Gulf of Mexico two days after it caught fire due to an 
explosion (BBC, 22.04.2010). Even though the reason has no official connection to IO, 
DailyWireless explain that Deepwater Horizon was upgraded in 2002 and used e-drilling, 
which constantly transfer data from rig operations to a monitoring center in Houston, when 
the accident happened (DailyWireless.Org, 01.05.2010).  
 
On the basis of IO concerns regarding the current development at the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf, the following research question was outlined: 
How do actors from different expert groups perceive risk and risk management in 
relation to petroleum production in an integrated operations environment? 
1.2 The Collaborating partners: SINTEF and the RIO-project 
As the largest independent research organisation in Scandinavia SINTEF was established in 
1950 by the Norwegian Institute of Technology (NTH), which today is incorporated in the 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), to be a link between academia 
and industry (SINTEF, 2007). Their goal is to create new knowledge and solutions on the 
basis of research and development within a broad spectre of disciplines, such as technology, 
natural sciences, medicine and social sciences (SINTEF, 2009). SINTEF’s Safety department 
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is located in Trondheim, with a primary research objective of providing a better in-depth 
understanding of how to assess, monitor and control safety and reliability. It is an 
interdisciplinary department that strives to analyse and develop new knowledge about the 
interfaces of humans, technology, organisation and safety. Additionally, the department create 
models, methods and standards in order to manage safety and reliability issues efficiently and 
proactively. The departments’ most important clients are the petroleum industry; both 
offshore and onshore, transportation and governmental administration (SINTEF, Teknologi og 
samfunn, u. d). 
 
Increased activity and incorporation of IO in the petroleum industry at the NCS led to the 
initiation of the RIO-project. The full project title is: Interdisciplinary Risk Assessment of 
Integrated Operations addressing Human and Organisational Factors (RIO). The project is 
run from the Department of Safety Research at SINTEF, Technology and Society, and funded 
by the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority, the IO-Centre at NTNU, and the 
PETROMARKS program of the Norwegian Research Council. The current technical risk 
analyses are believed insufficient in order to capture the new risks of IO, especially with 
regard to the impact of human and organisational factors. Thus, to gain the benefits of IO 
established risk approaches need to be supplemented by other approaches that address current 
human and organisational issues. The overall project goal of RIO is, therefore, to develop new 
knowledge (theories, models) and frameworks for reasoning that can be used as a basis for 
risk assessment in relation to petroleum production in an integrated operations environment. 
Furthermore, there is a need for a general framework that enables the creation and sharing of 
knowledge about risk among different petroleum actors to provide common understanding. 
Thus, the results of the RIO-project are expected to provide guidance to relevant practitioners 
in the petroleum industry (SINTEF, 2008). 
1.3 Structure 
Section 2 examines literature from relevant theoretical perspectives to shed light on the 
research question from various angles. Section 3 outlines the methodological approach of the 
thesis and thoroughly describes the research process. Choices that were made are mapped out 
and explained from the early planning phase to data collection and analysis until the end of 
the study. Section 4 presents the results of the interview study through quotes and summaries 
of the respondents’ statements. Section 5 discusses the research findings in light of relevant 
theory, before implications for further research and an overall conclusion, are stated. 
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1.4 Definition of concepts 
In order to fully comprehend fundamental aspects of the thesis a definition of the concepts 
involved are necessary1
 
. 
Defined situations of hazards and accidents is “used by petroleum companies operating on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf to specify a selection of hazardous and accidental events, based 
on which emergency preparedness can be established” (Tveiten, Albrechtsen, and Skjerve, 
2009, p. 5). 
 
Expert judgment is the “opinion of an authoritative person on a particular subject” (IPCS, 
2004, p. 12).  
 
Hazard2
 
 is seen as “the situation that in particular circumstances could lead to harm” (Warner, 
1992, p. 3). 
Integrated operations is “the use of information technology to change work processes in order 
to obtain improved decision-making, to control equipment and processes from a distance, and 
to relocate functions and personnel onshore”3
  
 (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 
2003-2004, p. 34).  
Major accident “an unexpected occurrence, failure or loss beyond normal or specified levels 
with the potential for harming human life, property or the environment” (EIONET, 2010, 
major accident). 
 
Risk is “the combination of the probability of an event and its consequences” (ISO/IEC, 2007, 
Guide 73, p. 4).  
 
                                                 
 
 
1 It should be noted that different definitions exist for some of the concepts utilised. However, the definitions 
outlined denote the concepts’ meaning in this thesis.  
2 The concepts of hazard and vulnerability are treated as synonyms in this thesis because of inconsistent use by 
respondents in the interview study. 
3 Translation by the author. 
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Risk communication is the “exchange or sharing of information about risk between the 
decision-maker and other stakeholders” (ISO/IEC, 2007, Guide 73, p. 5). 
 
Risk perception is the “the outcome of the processing, assimilation and evaluation of personal 
experiences, or information about risk, by individuals or groups in society” (Renn 2008: 374). 
 
Risk management is the “coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with 
regard to risk” (ISO/IEC, 2007, Guide 73, p. 5). 
 
Threat is the “potential cause of an unwanted incident, which may result in harm to a system 
or organization” (ISO/IEC, 2007, Guide 73, p. 6). 
 
Vulnerability4
                                                 
 
 
4 The concepts of hazard and vulnerability are treated as synonyms in this thesis because of inconsistent use by 
respondents in the interview study. 
 is the “weakness of an asset or control that can be exploited as a threat 
(ISO/IEC, 2007, Guide 73, p. 6). 
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2. Theory 
 
This section outlines selected theoretical perspectives that shed light on the research question. 
2.1 Integrated Operations  
This subsection will briefly denote the meaning and development of IOs. 
2.1.1 What are integrated operations?  
Recently a tremendous expansion in the use of information and communication technology 
(ICT), automation technology, sensor technology and smaller, isolated technologies has taken 
place in the petroleum sector at the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). This development 
together with altering work practices and new operational concepts is usually denoted 
integrated operations (IO) (OLF, 2008). There exists no common or agreed upon definition of 
IO (Tveiten et al., 2009), but different petroleum companies tend to use definitions with 
corresponding objectives (OLF, 2008). The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) 
defines IO as “real time data onshore, from offshore fields, and new integrated work 
processes” (OLF, 2008, p. 5). Several company dependent terms like smart operations, 
eOperations, smart filed, field of the future, real time operations, smart wells, i-field, eDrift, e-
drilling, digital oil field of the future/DOFF, and intelligent filed optimisation and remote 
management/INFORM also refer to IO (OLF, 2006b). 
 
Three aspects constitute IO: utilisation of new ICT, altered work processes and relocation of 
operations. If any of these aspects occur separately, it is not IO. The petroleum industry is 
familiar with the use of ICT, as it has been used for a long time in planning and carrying out 
well drilling to optimise production. However, using ICT as a strategic tool to increase work 
efficiency and decision-processes, as well as delegate tasks between land and sea and between 
operators5
                                                 
 
 
5 Operator/ Operator companies are companies entitled to look for oil and gas, and start production if they find a 
field (PSA, 2010i, Operatørselskap/ Operatør). 
 and suppliers is the innovation of IO. As a result, the industry will incorporate new 
work processes and the latest ICT, in order to enhance automation (OLF, 2006b). According 
to The Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2003-2004) different petroleum 
companies tend to include different elements in the concept of IO. This has given rise to a 
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belief that IO will mean different things to different people, both now and in the future. In 
accordance, OLF published a report stating that the meaning of IO is expected to change over 
time and this development is comprised of three stages (See figure 1) (OLF, 2005).  
 
Figure 1. The Norwegian Oil Industry Association’s (OLF) suggestions of IO characteristics 
over time. Source: OLF, 2005, p. 9. Used with permission by OLF. 
 
According to OLF (2005) the first stage, traditional processes, is characterised by some of the 
following aspects:  
 Decision-making about operative elements is made offshore with limited support form 
onshore experts. 
 The organisational structure is traditional, indicating that onshore and offshore 
personnel are working in different units with dissimilar goals.  
 Plans and problem solving would be fragmented while one sought to develop 
disciplinary procedures. 
 The specialised IT-systems would be difficult and time consuming to use in order to 
gather needed data. 
 
OLF (2005) further explain that the second stage, generation 1, is expected to cause relatively 
simple but profound changes to the traditional work processes, including:  
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 Onshore and offshore personnel have become more closely integrated. 
 Decision-making, problem solving, data comparison, operation monitoring and 
comparison, as well as safety challenges, need to be solved in collaboration that is 
made possible by extensive use of real time data.  
 Onshore expert centres are expected to provide 24 hours support and be capable of 
running fields. 
 
Finally, OLF (2005) outline how the third stage, generation 2, signifies that: 
 Oil and gas fields on the NCS will be run by personnel located in operation centres 
onshore that belong to both operators and vendors;  
 The operation centres’ geographical location may vary within national as well as 
international borders.  
 Interaction with offshore fields is expected to continue relentlessly and is associated 
with automatic processes and digital services6
 Vendors are responsible for everyday work practices as well as decision-making, such 
as monitoring, analysing and optimising, tasks that were previously carried out by the 
operators. However, the operators will receive digital information in real time when 
irregularities are registered and make the necessary decisions in order to handle these 
situations and have the overall operative responsibility of fields at the NCS. 
.  
2.1.2 The implementation process  
A project named Integrated Work Processes (IWP) was initiated by OLF in the autumn of 
2004, to make use of IO in order to improve the Norwegian sector’s economic growth. The 
implementation of IWP was allegedly successful. It was supported by several initiatives 
“launched by operators, partners, OLF, NPD as well as universities and R&D institutions” 
(OLF, 2005, p. 3). Although the technological development of creating IO solutions had 
already been initiated, OLF portrays 2005 as the starting point for IO. According to the 
timeframe of IO (see figure 1), generation 2 is expected to be fully implemented by 2015 
(OLF, 2005). However, as the implementation of IO was initiated at a different pace 
throughout various companies it quickly became evident that the field development, uptake of 
new ICT and work processes was moving too slowly. Consequently, a new report in 2008 
                                                 
 
 
6 Digital services are operational concepts that are based on delivery of large portions of the services required to 
operate a field “over the net” (OLF, 2005, p.17).  
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stated that the chance of reaching the full potential of IO in the expected time frame was 
small. The large number of isolated and varied solutions across an even greater amount of oil 
and gas fields was described as a significant concern in the current situation. The development 
of a general process for implementing new integrated solutions had turned out to be difficult 
due to the complexity of the new applications and their many interfaces (OLF, 2008). 
2.1.3 Pros and cons of IO 
A major goal of IO is their ability to improve the potential for value creation on the NCS 
(OLF, 2005). It has been estimated that new technical and organisational solutions could 
increase oil recovery by 3-4%, accelerate production by 5-10% and lower operational costs by 
20-30% (OLF, 2003). Increased profit is considered a possibility, as new ICT might create 
faster and better decision-making that can enhance production and extract a greater deal of 
natural recourses (OLF, 2006a). Additionally, IO are emphasised as creators of positive 
organisational changes with regard to work processes, infrastructure and the use of 
collaboration technology (Tveiten et al., 2009). Equally, the Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy stated: 
“The foundation of e-operations is computer technology, which enables information to 
be transferred across extensive distances with hardly any delay. Onshore personnel 
will therefore receive identical information at the same time, as offshore personnel. 
This increases the opportunity to change ways of working. Different technology and 
knowledge may join together and unite work tasks concerning ocean and shore, 
operators and suppliers” (The Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2003-
2004, p. 34-35). 
 
Moreover, OLF (2006a, 2006b, 2008) outlines how IO may result in improved health, safety 
and environment (HSE) performance as the risk is reduced within many operational sectors. 
For instance, the utilisation of remote operations will enable installations to reduce their 
amount of personnel. Consequently, less people will be exposed to hazards and risk. The risk 
management of HSE may also improve, since more and better information is obtainable 
through real time data. The response time when incidents occur may become shorter due to 
the onshore/offshore integration, and safety levels might improve due to the application of 
new ICT and work processes. Similarly, Ringstad and Andersen (2006) emphasise that IO 
might have beneficial effects on HSE. For example, successful implementation of IO might 
benefit areas like drilling, reservoir management/production, processing and maintenance. 
Risk management in general is likely to experience a positive development of IO, as it is 
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possible to use tools for analysis in real time. Additionally, IO is expected to originate a better 
connection between disciplines and improved decision-making (OLF, 2006b). 
 
Nevertheless, the implementation of IO has also brought about concerns with regard to new 
and altering risk aspects. Tveiten et al. (2009) predict that IO will create new challenges in 
relation to training and emergency exercises. Ringstad and Andersen (2006) outline the four 
key areas in which they expect HSE challenges to occur. Workload refers to the mental 
workload remaining offshore personnel might face as tasks and colleagues are relocated 
onshore. Work place design refers to the planning of permanent operation rooms in order to 
provide employees with ergonomics and support facilities, as well as the installation of 
communication tools in expected areas that are easy to find. Accident risk refers to how 
decision-makers may have less hands-on experience or the fact that a breakdown in 
onshore/offshore communication might occur. Competence refers to how training will be 
required at individual levels to master new work procedures, and across disciplines to join 
together multidisciplinary teams.  
2.2 Risk  
This subsection seeks to illustrate some of the complexity that surrounds risk and risk 
perception, as well as briefly draw attention to a couple of central theories on risk perception.   
2.2.1 Examples of risk perspectives  
According to Slovic (2000) the concept of risk is subjective and invented by humans in order 
to understand and handle the many hazards and uncertainties of life. He furthermore 
emphasises hazard as real, but claims no such thing about risk, which is established as neither 
real nor objective as all evaluations of risk are founded upon theoretical models. Renn (2008) 
refers to risk as a complex concept that has instigated many debates in various academic 
disciplines. Furthermore, he emphasises that perspectives and classifications on how to 
describe and understand risk in general originate from scientific theories. In addition, he 
claims it is possible to argue that all risk concepts have one element in common: the 
distinction between reality and possibility (Renn, 1992).  
 
There have been several attempts to map out and categorise risk. One of them is the 
systematic classification of risk perspectives (see figure 2) developed by Renn (1992). He 
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explains the different outlooks on risk according to academic disciplines and distinguishes 
between technical, economical, psychological, sociological and cultural science.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. A systematic classification of risk perspectives Source: Renn, 1992, p. 57. Used 
with permission by the creator: Renn, O. 
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2. Theory 
Technical disciplines like engineering science tend to denote risk as “a functional relationship 
between probability and adverse effects” (Renn 2008, p. 98) and it holds three main 
approaches: actuarial, toxicological and epidemiological7
 
. The underpinning element of the 
actuarial approach is expected value (EV), whereas the toxicology and epidemiology 
approach explicitly explore model value, and the engineering approach holds the synthesised 
EV (Renn 1992). Aadnoy, Cooper, Miska, Mitchell, and Payne (2009) elaborate how the oil 
and gas industries are founded upon engineering principles in relation to well drilling. In 
accordance, Crossland, Bennett, Ellis, Gittus, Godfrey, Hambly, Kletz, and Lees (1992) 
explain how risk estimation areas by engineers tend to fall into one of the following three 
categories: a) Statistical risk estimations which identify a number of casualties; b) Established 
risk in which the link between causes and injury is difficult to trace, like cancer after radiation 
exposure; c) Estimated risk of likely events that have not yet occurred.  
The economic perspective of risk is closely related to that of technical science, while 
psychological science gives the concept a more substantial and complex meaning (Krimsky 
and Golding, 1992). Through a psychological perspective, risk is influenced by subjective 
assessments, decision-making and contextual settings. The psychological research on risk 
seeks to move away from the somewhat narrow comprehension, which often exists, that risk 
concerns solely quantitative measures that are possible to assess and estimate (Renn, 2008). 
The field of risk psychology is dedicated to showing that the complexity of risk is dependent 
on the context in which the term is used, while seeking to explain how human perception, 
attitude, judgment and action influence risk related issues (Breakwell, 2007). Psychological 
analyses of risk are extensive and important processes that concern risk at individual, 
institutional and societal levels (Hastie and Dawes, 2001).  
 
The sociological outlook on risk is diverse as it comprises not one, but several minor 
perspectives that are difficult to unite. These include organisational studies, accident studies, 
media coverage and communication, risk conflicts and reasons, justice and equity, population 
studies and epistemology of risk knowledge (Renn, 1992). Cultural theories of risk emphasise 
the human interaction and reject theories about isolated and rational actors. The social 
response to risk is related to cultural patterns and values. Hence, they both believe that risk 
                                                 
 
 
7 Toxicological and epidemiological refer to assessments of health and environmental risks (Renn, 1992, p. 58).  
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attitude studies, based on group or societal levels, need to be done with respect to the cultural 
environment and the individuals belonging to it (Haukelid, 1999).  
2.2.2 Risk perception 
According to Slovic (1992a) the term risk perception originates in psychology and seeks to 
explain how people understand and evaluate risk and the concept as referring to individuals’ 
subjective impressions of risk. He further believes that risk cannot be perceived in the sense 
of being taken up by the human senses, such as images of real phenomena like a hazard. 
Consequently, human risk perception needs to be understood through a mixture of science and 
judgment that comprises psychological, social, cultural and political factors (Slovic, 1992b). 
According to Renn (2008) risk perception is commonly known as a label that tends to be used 
by the social sciences in relation to human decision-making about events, situations or 
activities that could lead to negative consequences. He explains how an early belief claimed 
that risk perception was influenced by facts or elements understood as facts due to association 
with risk analysts, scientists or other experts. However, it was soon discovered that not only 
estimations of technical risk influenced risk perception but numerous other components had 
explanatory value (Sjöberg, 2000). For instance, people with various educational 
backgrounds, interests and/or tenure often perceive risk differently (Sjöberg, 1998). Human 
traits like personality, cognitive features, presumptions and experience (Renn, 2008), as well 
as characteristics such as self-efficacy, control and profession belonging are also mentioned. 
Additionally, group factors like nationality and culture and socio-demographical 
characteristics, like sex and race, are viewed as explanatory elements of risk perception 
(Breakwell, 2007). 
 
The fact that people seem to link expectations, ideas, hopes, fears and other emotions to 
events with uncertain outcomes, have resulted in attempts to map out consistent patterns of 
how people understand and think about risk. However, the degree of perceived seriousness of 
a risk seems to be strongly related to actual exposure, rather than to the number of fatalities, 
which most risk assessments8
                                                 
 
 
8 Risk assessment is the task of identifying and exploring, preferably in quantifying terms, the likelihood of the 
consequences related to a risk. Risk assessment comprises hazard identification and estimation, exposure, and 
vulnerability assessment and risk estimation (Renn, 2008, p. 373).  
 are based upon (Renn, 2008). Perez-Floriano, Flores-Mora, and 
MacLean (2007) mention how trust can be an important and influencing factor of risk 
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perception, especially in relation to complex technology. For instance, employees who are 
exposed to high risk and difficult technology are found to be more comfortable and perform 
their tasks in a more relaxed way if they trust that management will not expose them to 
unnecessary harm or unknown hazards. Because of the concept’s complexity research from 
areas such as geography, sociology, political science, anthropology and psychology have 
contributed to the understanding of human risk perception through various theories and 
models (Slovic, 1992b). However, attempts to model risk perception have mainly been done 
in two very different ways. On the one hand is a mainly theoretical approach, for example 
cultural theory, and on the other you have the empirically based Psychometric paradigm 
(Sjöberg and Drottz-Sjöberg, 2009). 
2.2.3 Theories of risk perception  
Cultural theory seems to have originated from two different quarters. According to Rayner 
(1992), it arose from Michael Thompson’s article “Aesthetics of risk: culture or context” 
published in 1980. In contrast Wildavsky (1993) claims that the 1982 paper “Risk and culture: 
An essay on the selection of technical and environmental dangers” by Mary Douglas and 
himself is the theory’s starting point. Nevertheless, Cultural theory suggests that risk is 
defined, perceived and managed in the course of inherent, cultural and social factors. For 
instance, people decide what to fear in order to protect their way of life, such as hazards that 
threaten locally valued social and institutional arrangements (Rayner, 1992). Systematic 
variation in risk perception may seem inevitable as people come from different cultural 
backgrounds (Breakwell, 2007). Critics of cultural theory stress how the developed principles 
have limited practical meaning (Rayner, 1992). Even though the theory’s ability to identify 
dominant cultural patterns that determine individual and social responses to risk is influential, 
social scientists discuss the patterns validity in terms of theoretical interpretation and 
empirical support (Renn, 2008). 
 
The psychometric paradigm is a methodological approach that enables researchers to create 
explanatory models about human comprehension of risk, such as the psychometric model 
(Breakwell, 2007). The approach seeks to find an explanation regarding differences in risk 
perception between for instance lay people (the public) and experts (Golding, 1992). It was 
influenced by Chauncey Starr (1969) who wanted to create a method that made it possible to 
evaluate technical risks alongside the question of acceptability (Slovic, 1992b). By using 
psychometric scaling methods and analysis techniques the psychometrical paradigm aims to 
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produce qualitative measures or cognitive maps that explain human risk perception and 
attitudes (Slovic, 1992b). Although utilisation of this approach has produced interesting 
results, inspiring further research, it has limitations with regard to its strong assumptions 
(Slovic, 1992a). The psychometric paradigm is supported by the psychometric model, which 
holds explanatory scales that allows participants to rate hazards according to factors such as 
novelty and dread (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read and Combs, 1978). The 
psychometric model’s explanatory value was initially believed to be extremely good and 
account for 60-70% of variations in perceived risk. Consequently, the model was highly 
respected and was used as a basis for extensive research on risk communication (Sjöberg, 
2000). Nonetheless, when new factors where added the explanatory value of the psychometric 
model and cultural theory have turned out to be significantly poorer than previously assumed 
(Sjöberg, 1998). The psychometric model has been found to explain 20% of the perceived 
variation in risk perception, while cultural theory merely explains 5-10% (Sjöberg, 2000). In 
spite of its shortcomings the psychometric model is still the most promising model of risk 
perception (Sjöberg and Drottz-Sjöberg, 2009).  
2.3 Decision-making about risk 
This subsection briefly outlines a few of the central historical aspects of decision-making 
theory on risk. Next, relevant findings from decision-making studies on risk are mapped out 
before decision-making relevance in relation to IO is portrayed. 
2.3.1 Historical aspects  
Initially, financial aspects were established as the motive of all human judgements calls. This 
belief is presented in several normative decision-making theories, such as the expected utility 
theory (Plous, 1993). Expected utility theory originated from a book called Theory of games 
and economic behavior by mathematician John Von Neumann and economist Oskar 
Morgenstern, published in 1947 (Dawes, 1998). The theory is founded upon an extensive, 
fundamental economic belief that financial traders make rational choices (Hastie and Dawes, 
2001). Then, in 1976 Baruch Fischhoff, Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic established the 
academic centre of decision research on risk. Their research focused on behavioural decision 
theory, particularly probability judgment, risk perception and risk management. Slovic, 
Fischhoff and Lichtenstein are some of the main researchers involved in the development of 
the decision-making approach of the psychometric paradigm (Golding, 1992). In 1979 the 
prospect theory was published by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. It was 
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promoted as an alternative view of the expected utility theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
According to Kahneman and Tversky, the reference frame in which a choice is referred to is a 
central variable that affects risk. Human choices are portrayed according to reference frames 
of loss or gain, which influence and determine whether a decision-maker believes the choice 
to hold an acceptable risk limit or not (1979, 1984). According to Slovic, Kunreuther and 
White (1992) previous findings have discovered that aspects such as financial profit, cultural 
terms, decision-makers’ personality, environmental and organisational conditions cannot 
alone explain human judgements about risk. Therefore, a more complex interpretation of 
decision-making about risk is needed for it to be acknowledged as a multidimensional 
phenomenon. 
2.3.2 Relevant research findings  
According to Breakwell (2007), all judgments involve risk to some extent as the decision-
maker has to consider the possibility of uncertain consequences or losses. Plous (1993) 
explains how the human decision-making process about risk usually portrays two aspects: 
first, what and who does it concern; second, what and how to choose. Rational problem 
solving strategies and heuristics are often portrayed as two of the most utilised decision-
making processes. However, they tend to be under the influence of bias and predictable 
irregularities. For instance, people tend to overestimate rare incidents like plane crashes and 
nuclear accidents while minor, more frequent events, which often happen at home or at the 
office, are underestimated (Garland, 2003). Rational problem solving strategies identify a 
problem and then analyse it according to every potential influential positive and negative 
aspect. Since it is difficult to obtain all the required information, the process is often 
incomplete and people settle with decisions they find good enough but not necessarily ideal 
(Kobbeltvedt and Brun, 2005). 
 
Heuristics are various types of shortcuts used to reduce the complexity of a judgment process 
concerning risk (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). For instance, when information is inadequate, 
absent or ambiguous, heuristics can function as simple but effective guidelines (Hastie and 
Dawes, 2001). According to Fiske and Taylor (1991) the three most common heuristics are:  
 Representativeness, which is concerned with probability judgment. For example, it is 
typically expected that an objective A belong to category B, if A resembles B in some 
way.  
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 Availability is concerned with frequency or probability judgments. For instance, 
estimations are often offered on the basis of how often something happens, and how 
quickly one can remember this event.  
 Adjustment and anchoring are concerned with estimations of position on a dimension, 
like evaluating a person’s efficiency on account of one’s own level of efficiency.  
 
Even though the outcome might prove negative heuristics are often chosen as rational 
problem solving strategies because they are faster (Bjørklund, 2005). Moreover, the risk 
related judgments seem to be influenced by governmental, as well as individual, logical 
explanations and perspectives. The following two aspects have been acknowledged as 
significant risk judgment components factors: 1) risk perception, which is believed to be a 
central component related to individuals’ comprehensions, attitudes and estimations about 
risks and hazards (Breakwell 2007); 2) emotions, especially affects (Loewenstein et al., 2001; 
Kobbeltvedt and Brun, 2005). Much of today’s research on individual decision-making about 
risk seeks to understand which processes make up the base when people use information, and 
the significance of emotional components (Renn, 2008). 
2.3.3 Decision-making and IO 
According to Ringstad and Andersen (2007) a central premise underlying the entire 
Norwegian petroleum industry’s IO focus is the belief that IO will improve decision-making 
and lead to safer and more efficient operations. A number of IO characteristics for improved 
judgment calls have been outlined, such as utilisation of real time data, increased 
interdisciplinary collaboration, enhanced work performance from remote locations and 
parallel work mode. However, concerns have also been mentioned in relation to IO and 
decision-making. Examples include: employees’ being negative about change; unclear areas 
of responsibility due to choices made in groups or across distributed teams; information 
overload; decreased rig understanding due to relocation of personnel; increased complexity 
diminishing an overview.  
2.4 Complex organisations and the risk of major accidents  
This subsection draws attention to central organisational aspects regarding the risk of major 
accidents.  
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2.4.1 Increased focus  
Major accident studies in relation to complex technology have been a central research area for 
decades due to catastrophes like Chernobyl9 and Piper Alfa10 (Haukelid, 1999; Lancaster, 
2000; Reason, 2008). Following the Alexander Kielland11 accident the Norwegian petroleum 
sector initiated an extensive focus on major accidents as they are considered a threat to 
companies’ goal achievement as well as to society in general. According to the Petroleum 
Safety Authorities Norway12
 
 (PSA) major accidents usually arise as a sudden incident, such 
as oil spillage, fire or explosion, with serious consequences like damage to people and/or loss 
of human lives, serious environmental damage and/or loss of financial assets, emerge (PSA, 
2010e). To develop preventive measures petroleum companies need to be aware of their 
responsibilities and requirements (PSA, 2010c). In the summery report of 2009 the PSA 
announced “there have been no major accidents, by our definition, on installations on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf after 1990” (PSA, 2009, p. 14). However, the recent accident 
that took place at international levels as the oilrig Deepwater Horizon exploded, caught fire 
and sank in the Gulf of Mexico mid-April this year, has brought about a fresh concern for 
major accidents in the industry. The rig was owned by Transocean the world’s 
largest offshore drilling contractors, and leased by BP, the UK’s largest multinational oil 
company. In the accident eleven workers lost their lives and several were wounded. 
Continuously, significant environmental damage is expected, as the rig presumably leaks 
8,000 barrels of oil each day (BBC, 22.04.2010). Immediately after the accident, PB several 
times unsuccessfully tried to stop the enormous oil spillage. As a result, the accident is now 
considered the worst in US history with the recent numbers that indicates an oil spill between 
35.000 and 60.000 barrels a day (BBC, 21.06.2010). 
Following the Deepwater Horizon accident the PSA reported that it was impossible to specify 
assessments or comparisons to Norwegian requirements or conditions, since it is still 
unknown what caused the accident in the Gulf of Mexico. Subsequently, it was stressed that 
                                                 
 
 
9 The Chernobyl disaster is a nuclear accident that occurred in Ukraine on the 26th April 1986 (Reason, 2008, p. 
49).  
10 On the 6th July 1988 the Piper Alfa platform exploded and caught fire, killing 167 people (Lancaster, 2000, p. 
119).  
11 The Alexander Kielland accident is considered to be the worst since the Second World War. The platform 
collapsed into the ocean at night on the 27th March 1980. Of the 212 offshore personnel 123 died (Lancaster, 
2000, p. 105). 
12 The Petroleum Safety Authorities Norway is the regulatory authority for technical and operational safety at the 
Norwegian petroleum sector (PSA, 2010a). 
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petroleum companies at the NCS need to be attentive to the ongoing investigation as 
petroleum companies have individual responsibilities to carry out risk assessments on the 
basis of all available knowledge, including international incidents (PSA, 2010b). In this 
respect the statement from Offshore Magazine might be of some interest. Accordingly 
Deepwater Horizon had been utilizing a new system called e-drilling since the end of 2002, 
that monitors drilling equipment in near real-time to reduce the rigs downtime. E-drilling was 
continuously stated as developed by Varco International13
2.4.2 Man, technology and organisation  
 and the industry's first system for 
remotely monitoring and diagnosing Varco equipment on oilrigs anywhere in the world. E-
drilling would transfer data via an Internet link to a manned service center based in Houston, 
Texas. The center holds a staff of trained technicians and engineers that monitor rig activities 
24 hours a day and offers remote problem-solving by communicating monitoring, 
maintenance, and trouble- shooting information to the workers on the rig. As a result, drilling 
companies would be able to maximize equipment operation and minimize downtime 
(Offshore, 2002). 
The ongoing expansion of ICT, globalisation and diversity are often characterised as the basis 
for numerous organisational demands, challenges and transitions that have originated during 
the past decades (Haukedal, 2005). Increased complexity at the industrial work arena and 
more demanding work environments are considered likely originators of both minor and 
major hazards. Consequently, many organisations methodologically try to outline which 
serious actions need to be carried out to identify risks and prevent them from surfacing 
(Furnham, 2005). Reason (1997) stressed that sever accidents in complex organisations 
usually originate on the basis of errors or because defence barriers have been bypassed. Man, 
technology and organisation (MTO) are portrayed as likely and implicating factors. Ringstad 
and Andersen (2006) describe the three concepts as follow:  
 Man denotes human factors like motivation, skills and abilities.  
 Technology embodies tools and facilities. 
 Organisation refers to formal and informal communication patterns, procedures and 
culture. 
                                                 
 
 
13 “Varco International Systems is the industry leader in the design and manufacture of Top Drive drilling 
systems, with more than 600 currently in operation. Varco also leads in the development of automated and semi-
automated pipe handling and transfer equipment” (The Subsea Oil & Gas Directory, Varco International, 2000-
2009). 
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The need to understand employees’ mindsets has grown during the last decade, as several of 
today’s complex organisations use intricate technological innovations together with a 
tremendous demand for human expertise. These factors challenge a company’s staff and force 
management and employees to conceptualise new ideas in terms of action (Parker, 2008). 
Human errors are portrayed as one of the most common reasons for accidents at work, often 
caused by aspects such as extreme cognitive demands combined with stress (Furnham, 2005). 
Additionally, aspects such as weakened cross-disciplinary communication and lack of 
competence might influence and increase the potential for human errors (Breakwell, 2007). 
However, technical factors such as maintenance management, levels of automation, 
man/system interfaces, engineering control design and hardware are also portrayed as 
potential factors for major accidents (Reason, 1997). According to OLF (2005) facilitation of 
automatic processes and implementation of digital service following IO, will require a new 
conceptualisation of MTO that can clarify how virtual organisations behave when fields are 
operated across geographical borders by the use of new multimedia, visualisation and 
cooperation tools, as well as in relation to complex control and optimisation solutions. 
Ringstad and Andersen (2006) stress how MTO as a key concept, in combination with new 
work forms and work processes of IO, might generate easy and robust channels for IO 
communication with beneficial HSE effects.  
2.4.3 Competence and experience 
Reason (1997) stated that if an unexpected situation demands action improvisation on the 
basis of previous knowledge and experience might be the employees’ only solution. Thus, 
lack of competent, experienced personnel might contribute to increased risk of major 
accidents. According to OLF (2007) IO are moving in the right direction, but greater 
progression is desired as the main focus so far has been directed at business and strategic 
processes, concerning generation 1. In contrast, little effort has been made towards generation 
2. In order to succeed with the complex socio-technical interaction of generation 2 
competence is portrayed as a key element. Furthermore, experience and competence are put 
forward as major obstacles when aiming for generation 2 and work forms based on 
interdisciplinary cooperation in real time. The reason being that lack of competence will make 
it difficult to illustrate the gains of IO needed to accelerate the process (OLF, 2007). Tveiten, 
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Lunde-Hanssen, Grøtan and Pehrsen (2008) explain that there seem to be important 
connections between vital IOs changes and the risk of systemic accidents14
2.5 Risk Management 
. It is furthermore 
emphasised that at the moment adequate knowledge about these connections are absent. 
However, some knowledge is claimed to be available through research while some knowledge 
has to be gained through practical experience and assessments made throughout individual 
companies. Nevertheless, utilising open forums as an arena to share knowledge about 
previous experiences might become a preventative measure.  
This subsection will outline relevant theoretical risk management perceptions, and present 
challenges in the petroleum sector at the NCS. 
2.5.1 What is risk management? 
All technological organisations like those in the petroleum industry expose people and assets 
to danger. Consequently, different types of protection are required, such as layers of defences, 
barriers and safeguards that are solid enough to withstand both natural and manmade hazards 
(Reason, 1997). Risk management is one of the greatest challenges that need to be met if safe 
and healthy work environments are to be maintained (Perez-Floriano et al., 2007). According 
to Breakwell (2007) risk management is concerned with managing circumstances created by 
the company itself as well as external hazards that might damage the company as a whole. 
The Petroleum Safety Authorities Norway (PSA) states the following about risk management: 
“Risk management is about evaluating, prioritizing and directing the resources to the 
most gainful areas. Managing risk assumes recognition of its existence - and 
understanding of what the risk consists of. There is risk related to any activity 
managed by people, and it is important to be conscious of this risk and deal with it. All 
efforts to prevent accidents and undesirable incidents from taking place are about 
managing risk. Thus, it is impossible to manage risk if we do not know which elements 
risk consists of, and which incident mechanisms may take place” (PSA, 2010d). 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
14 ”Systemic accidents or disasters are accidents we remember and hear about for years after the event. They 
leave a mark in the shape of changes to regulations or work procedures, or in the shape of companies losing their 
reputation or substantial assets”... “Systemic accidents often involve the loss of many lives, such as in the 
Alexander Kielland and Piper Alpha disasters.”... They... ”also include accidents with a great impact on society 
or the environment such as the Longford disaster” (Tveiten et al., 2008, p. 5).    
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2.5.2 Rules and regulations 
According to Perez-Floriano et al. (2007) three different authorities are usually responsible 
for managing risk in companies and organisations: the company management, the government 
and the company’s federation. However, the company is often perceived as the main 
responsible party. Haukelid (1999) stressed how the Norwegian petroleum industry was 
previously influenced by Safety Management Philosophy, a philosophy that originates from 
management theory and was introduced in the sector during the 1980s. The following 
principles were some of the central regulations:  
 Management was responsible for all safety aspects, and their involvement in security 
matters had to be observable. 
 Security was to be controllable and all accidents avoidable.  
 Security was portrayed as just as important as production and quality. 
 
Today, guidelines on the regulations about the petroleum sector at the NCS are often 
influenced by national standards like NORSOK, DnV and OLF, and international standards 
such as ISO, IEC, EN (SPA, 2010h). In relation to risk reduction the PSA Framework 
Regulations15
“Harm or danger of harm to people, the environment or to financial asserts shall be 
prevented or limited in accordance with the legislations relating to health, the 
environment and safety, including international requirements and acceptance criteria. 
Over and above this level the risk shall be further reduced to the extent possible. 
Assessments on the basis of this provision shall be made in all phases of the petroleum 
activities” (Framework Regulations, section 9). 
 state: 
 
However, at the moment, no overall IO-regulations exist because the new operating practices 
are being implemented by the industry itself, and because it is still not clear what the new 
technological opportunities and changes of IO will signify. Responsibility of IO therefore 
rests upon individual companies. However, the PSA seeks to make sure that different players 
within the sector are aware of their areas of responsibility. This concerns onshore functions 
that are safety-critical for work offshore and vice versa. Since specific IO changes may 
involve new divisions of responsibilities and/or roles, as well as the transfer of decision-
making authority across time zones and cultural or national boundaries, the PSA’s goals are to 
                                                 
 
 
15 The Framework Regulations constitute the basic frame of reference for all other regulations issued by the PSA 
(Tveiten et al., 2009, p. 8). 
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identify how the development of IO will affect aspects such as work processes and 
arrangements of petroleum activities (PSA, 2010g). 
2.5.3 Risk management strategies 
To manage risk organisations need to develop strategies that can be used to locate the variety 
of elements that comprise hazards (Reason, 2008). Risk management strategies are usually 
developed by identifying problem and problem areas that correspond with a company’s 
objectives. Probability assessments of different risk aspects are then carried out, which 
present a variety of different solutions. The organisation then decides which actions to initiate, 
implements them and evaluates the final results (Breakwell 2007). Since protection of health, 
safety and the environment is a collective responsibility risk management strategies should be 
integrated within all areas of an organisation. Thorough planning, organising, implementation 
and control of the various hazards are required (Wentz, 1998).  
 
According to OLF (2007), risk management strategies in the petroleum industry at the NCS 
are usually concerned with barriers and barrier thinking. The PSA explains how barriers are 
systems or operations that can prevent or reduce consequences of undesirable incidents. 
Moreover, they can either be denoted as physical of non-physical barriers. Non-physical 
barriers refer to operational or organisational barriers. However, all barriers tend to include at 
least one physical barrier element, for example a valve. Overall, “barriers are implemented 
into design and procedures, according to rules and regulations, with the objective of 
diminishing risk to personnel, materiel and the environment”16
 
 (PAS, 2010f). According to 
Tveiten et al. (2009) established barriers should reduce the probability of accidents and/or 
outline how to limit possible harm and nuisance that may follow from failures and defined 
situations of hazards and accidents (DSHA). The PSA claim that none of the DSHA for major 
accidents at the NCS has entailed fatalities in the last two decades. The last time fatalities 
were associated with one of a major accident’s DSHA was in 1985 with the shallow gas 
blowout on the rig West Vanguard (PSA, 2009, p. 14).  
According to Tveiten et al. (2009) speculations regarding whether or not current DSHA 
sufficiently would prevent hazards when full-scale IO is implemented, have been uttered. 
                                                 
 
 
16 Translation from Norwegian to English by the author (PSA, 2010f ).  
 
 
23 
 
2. Theory 
However, the existing DSHA are mainly believed to be sufficient as IO change’s supposedly 
only impact minor initiating events, and not the top events17
  
 that the DSHA are set to handle. 
As a result, developing IO-specific DSHA has been considered unnecessary as petroleum 
companies claim not to have detected any new incidents or accidents that could negatively 
affect humans, the environment, material or the reputation of IO. Nevertheless, Tveiten et al. 
(2009) found that new ICT-specific DSHA might become necessary as new risk aspects 
related to the transformation of ICT between offshore and onshore are likely to emerge. For 
instance, ICT-based process-control systems, power and ICT failure in control rooms can lead 
to both criminal and accidental events. Apprehensions regarding ICT problems due to IO 
were already expressed by OLF in 2005 as the common information security framework 
following the utilisation of the required digital networks of generation 1 and generation 2 
processes were lacking (OLF, 2005). Consequently, Information Security Baseline 
Requirements (ISBR) for ICT systems in process control, safety and support networks were 
developed. The controls for ISBR should work in addition to a company’s own information 
security policy and regulations, as well as the national legislation (OLF, 2006a). Still, 
scepticism towards ICT security and IO exist. For instance, the autumn 2009 edition of the 
scientific magazine GEMINI featured an article stating that petroleum companies’ data 
security is inadequate because of the extensive use and trust in the internet by IO. With IO 
contact between offshore and onshore will become transparent. The sector is therefore at risk 
of attacks by hackers, viruses and worms (GEMINI, 2009, p. 10). 
                                                 
 
 
17 Top events are those that imply or may lead directly to fatalities, damages, etc (Tveiten et al., 2009, p. 2). 
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3. Method 
This section outlines various aspects of the data collection and analysis and accounts for the 
choices that have been made during the research process. 
3.1 Study objective  
The primary objective of this study was to outline how people from different expert groups, 
connected to the oil and gas industry at the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), perceive risk 
and what their risk management suggestions are concerning the implementation of integrated 
operations. In what ways do the respondents seem to think in the same manner? In what ways 
are their perceptions different? By mapping out what the respondents’ impressions and 
concerns are it was intended that the findings would generate ideas and information which can 
be used as a basis for suggestions on how employees in the petroleum industry could avoid or 
manage problems due to the risk of integrated operations (IO). Having applied the relevant 
theory and examined the relevant literature from the academic fields of risk psychology and 
integrated operations a suggested answer to the research question stated below will be 
presented later in the report. 
3.1.1 Research question and research areas 
The research question is: 
 
How do actors from different expert groups perceive risk and risk management in 
relation to petroleum production in an integrated operations environment?  
 
However, because of the size of the research question, some limitations were needed. The 
following five research areas will provide an answer to the subject matter in question:  
 
1. Experts’ knowledge about integrated operations: This area provides an overview of: 
a) what specific IO expertise each interviewee in the four expert groups possess; b) 
what expectations and possibilities do they have towards IO. 
 
2. Definitions of risk: These are outlines of how each actor in the four expert groups 
defines risk.  
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3. Hazards and vulnerabilities of integrated operations: Participants’ risk perception 
of which hazards and vulnerabilities IO might inflict upon the industry. 
 
4. Major accidents and integrated operations: Participants’ risk perception of major 
accidents and IO with regard to aspects such as: general concerns, known or unknown 
risk aspects, feared magnitude, increased ICT demands and the probability of a major 
accident happening within the first ten years of using IO. 
 
5. Risk Management and integrated operations: This area is concerned with a) the 
necessity of an ICT-specific DSHA; b) what challenges the actors believe IO may 
impose on the industry in relation to risk management; c) suggestions on what can be 
done to improve risk management following IO implementation. 
3.1.2 Scientific view and research position 
More information is needed before good bases for preventative actions can be obtained and 
the gap between IO in industry and academia can be bridged. With this study it is assumed 
that the field of risk psychology will contribute to the RIO project’s objective with 
information about human perception and the management of risk. This broader objective is 
valuable for the overall project goal and provides some new and challenging findings that 
could contribute to improving solutions. 
 
According to both Silverman (2006) and Langdridge (2006), the course of action a researcher 
chooses to use and follow, in order to plan and execute a research study, tends to be 
influenced by prior knowledge and experiences about the world and the topic under 
investigation. By performing this research study, I believe it is possible to gain insight about 
the participants’ risk perception of integrated operations, and to say something significant 
about how risk is understood by them.  
3.2 Choice of method   
The research question and problem areas tend to define the study’s course of action with 
regard to which people or situations should be studied, what methods to use and how to do the 
analysis (Thagaard, 2003). A qualitative approach focuses on the variety of qualities a 
phenomenon possesses and is often concerned with handling meanings, which is mainly 
expressed through language and actions (Ashworth, 2008). Due to the objective and research 
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question of this thesis it was decided to pursue a qualitative approach through the use of semi-
structured interviews.  
3.2.1 The qualitative research interview  
“Interviews are, by their very nature, social encounters where speakers collaborate  
in producing retrospective (and prospective) accounts or versions of their 
 past (or future) actions, expectations, feelings and thoughts” (Rapley, 2007, p. 16). 
 
The semi-structured interview is one of the most common qualitative techniques, and is also 
known as the qualitative research interview (Silverman, 2006). In order to answer the research 
question it was necessary to gain insight into how people within the petroleum industry 
perceive risk in relation to IO and what their risk management suggestions’ are. Therefore, the 
semi-structured interview was chosen because it seemed like the most beneficial method to 
gather data. According to Thagaard (2003) the method is able to provide data on how 
respondents understand experiences and events in their own lives. Silverman (2006) 
emphasises how the method is particularly useful for accessing individuals’ attitudes and 
values. He further explains that, when done well, one may achieve a level of depth and 
complexity that is hardly available through other approaches. Thagaard (2003) also draws 
attention to the fact that questions and topics in a qualitative research interview are often 
prepared in advance, but it is open to sequential changes in an attempt to stay with the 
respondents’ stories. By doing so I was able to make room for valuable information that was 
difficult to foresee. In addition, the flexibility made it possible to construct the questions so 
they matched the uniqueness that each participant brought to the study.  
3.2.2 Methodological approach: Grounded theory  
Prior to working on the thesis I knew little of IO in the oil and gas industry, and therefore 
wished to use an explorative method that allowed for my ignorance and naivety. I felt that 
Grounded theory by Strauss and Corbin (1990) provided the guidelines best suited for this 
starting point. According to Strauss and Corbin (2008) a “grounded theory” is a theory that is 
discovered, developed and provisionally confirmed through systematic data collection and a 
systematic analysis of the gathered material. The theory’s intense focus on people and its 
ability to generate meaning, action and intention, as well as its vision of gaining knowledge 
by stepping into the data, opening it up and getting in touch with it, matches the objective of 
this thesis. Grounded theory provides explicit strategies on how to do a research study, 
including how to collect, analyse and treat the data material, but it became clear early on that I 
could not follow all of the method suggestions continuously. This decision was made due to 
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interest in the RIO-project. Kvale (1997) emphasises the importance of being aware that one’s 
methods and research techniques only provide guidelines to work by. They do not decide the 
process, but should rather be incorporated into it. I chose to relate to this statement, and 
therefore had Grounded theory’s vision in mind throughout the entire process, but only used 
some of its techniques as guidelines when coding and analysing the collected data material. 
3.3 Research design, approach and selection of interviewees 
The research design of this study was developed on the basis of the RIO-projects’ interests 
and needs, together with some of the project personnel. The study arose due to interest in how 
people who belong to different expert groups within the petroleum industry understand risk 
within the environment of IO. In other words, this thesis is designed as a case study. 
According to Thagaard (2003) the main characteristic of a case study is to gather and examine 
information through a few cases or entities (for example, persons, groups or organisations). 
Moreover, it was stated that the main objective of a case study is to gather rich data about the 
subject matter in question, while also having a comparative focus if the purpose is to do 
comparisons between different cases. 
 
The participants in this survey were selected based on their connection to companies within, 
or in relation to, the petroleum industry on the NCS, and with regard to personal experience 
and/or knowledge about integrated operations. The study sought participants from different 
areas of the petroleum sector with various IO-expertise. Interviewees were found by help of 
the project manager of RIO and some of the project personnel. They provided me with names 
of potential respondents. The respondents were contacted via e-mail, and most of the feedback 
was positive. People who did not reply within a week were contacted again by phone. A 
couple of those how were first contacted claimed to be inadequately skilled to participate in 
this study. However, they immediately recommended colleagues who might be interested, and 
put me in contact with them. Selecting interviewees in this manner is often referred to as 
collecting a convenience sample. The sample is also strategic as the respondents are chosen 
because they possess qualifications of relevance to the problem area and because of their 
availability to the researcher (Silverman, 2006). 
 
The e-mail each participant received contained a brief description of the thesis, including the 
research question, objective and purpose of the study. I also included some general 
information about the collaborating partner and RIO-project and a time estimate for how long 
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a potential interview would take. The purpose of this e-mail was to prepare the respondents by 
clarifying which frames and contexts the interview would hold in advance. When the day of a 
scheduled interview approached the respondent in question was contacted and asked to 
confirm the proceeding went as planned. Kvale (1997) indicates that respondents should be 
provided with an interview context both prior (briefing) and following (debriefing) the 
interviews. A debriefing did not seem necessary in this case, but after each interview the 
respondents were asked if they had anything to add or something was unclear, in order to 
provide a summary and avoid ending the meeting too abruptly.  
 
Thirteen interviewees participated in this study. The respondents were divided into expert 
groups based on their current place of work (see table 1). It is necessary to keep in mind that 
the respondents do not speak on behalf of the company or organisation they belong to, but 
simply speak on behalf of themselves and share their individual opinions and thoughts. 
According to Thagaard (2003) it is important that a qualitative study is not too large. It should 
be possible to perform profound analysis of each response. A total number of 13 respondents, 
within categories of approximately equal size, are therefore considered sufficient to gain 
insight on the research area in question.  
 
Table 1. An overview of the categorisation of the study’s 13 participants and how they were 
interviewed. 
Group A: Industry 
- R5 (telephone interview) 
- R7 (videoconference interview) 
- R8 (face-to-face interview) 
- R10 (telephone interview) 
Group B: Researchers 
- R3 (face-to-face interview) 
- R4 (face-to-face interview) 
- R13 (telephone interview) 
 
Group C: Supervisors 
- R2 (face-to-face interview) 
- R11 (videoconference interview) 
- R12 (telephone interview) 
Group D: Risk Analysis Consultants (RAC) 
- R1 (face-to-face interview) 
- R6 (face-to-face interview) 
- R9 (face-to-face interview) 
3.4 Creation of the interview guide 
The interview guide for this thesis was semi-structured. According to Rapley (2007) a semi-
structured interview normally has a fixed set of questions, and subject areas ready prior to the 
interview being carried out. Creating the interview guide was an interesting process. Initially 
it was necessary to acquire up-to-date information on the subject matter, which was obtained 
 
 
29 
 
3. Method 
through reading the relevant literature. I also attended a couple of IO and risk related 
conferences. Thereafter a first draft of the interview guide was developed and e-mailed to the 
RIO-project’s manager, some of the project’s personnel, and my supervisory professor. I 
received criticisms and tips for improvement from all parties. A revised second draft was 
developed and distributed for comment. Based on feedback on the second version final 
themes and questions were settled upon. 
  
The interview guide was developed according to the four main topics identified as central and 
necessary to answer the research question. Thagaard (2003) describes how one of the goals of 
qualitative interviewing is to get in-depth information about the subject matter. One should 
therefore ask questions that are easy to reflect upon and provide full answers to. In order to 
make sure the interview guide had accurate questions, able to gather information on the topic 
under consideration, a couple of pilot interviews were performed prior to the first interview. 
Wengraf (2001) draws attention to the fact that a semi-structured interview guide often 
requires additional preparation because, based on the interviewees responses, the researcher 
needs to be prepared to both improvise answers and originate follow-up questions at all times. 
Since the interview would be semi-structured it was important to be open to unexpected 
statements. I therefore spent a lot of time considering which aspects, among the central topics, 
would be interesting and worthwhile to pursue in order to capture the varying perspectives 
brought out through the interviews.  
3.5 Conducting the interviews  
The interviews were carried out one to one in the language preferred by the interviewee. 
According to Thagaard (2003), this is the most common approach for an interview. However, 
the interview surroundings were not identical throughout the 13 interviews. Three different 
proceedings were used. Seven interviews were conducted face-to-face, two were conducted 
using video conferencing equipment, and four by telephone (see table 1). All of the required 
telephone and video conferencing equipment was made available, by the collaborating 
partners within the RIO-project, at SINTEF’s offices in Trondheim. The reason three different 
interview settings were chosen had to do with economy and convenience. The face-to-face 
interviews were conducted at the stakeholders’ offices, as I wanted to disturb the respondents 
as little as possible and avoid inconveniencing them by obliging them to travel. No funds 
were available to cover travel expenses to meet the remaining six respondents face-to-face, 
due to the distances involved, so these interviews had to be conducted in a different way.  
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Allowing respondents to be in familiar surroundings during interviews hopefully made them 
feel relaxed and comfortable. Thagaard (2003) emphasises how the fundamental objective of 
an interview is to create an atmosphere of trust that enables interviewees to relax and share 
information about a pursued topic. Yet, it is important to be aware of the fact that using three 
different interview settings may have influenced the data material and hence the results. 
According to Rapley (2007), the use of ICT equipment like videoconference and telephone 
may influence the collected data. In this study all of the collected data material is treated 
equally and analysed accordingly. However, the possibility of biased data, and hence results, 
are taken into consideration later in the discussion in section 5. 
 
When conducting the interviews I stayed mainly within the pre-developed categories and 
questions of the interview guide. However, when the respondents mentioned unclear or vague 
topics I asked for clarifications. In that way, the necessary explanation about a topic or aspect 
was provided by the respondents themselves. Langdridge (2006) stresses how the semi-
structured interview does not need to stick to the interview guide at all times, but can be 
altered during the interview to be in accordance with the respondent’s story. If an interviewee 
starts on an interesting digression the interviewer is free to put forward follow-up questions as 
he or she sees fit, before returning to the interview guide. Kvale (1997) emphasises the 
importance of letting the interview be fairly open in order to acquire valuable information that 
the researcher had not thought of in advance. Each interview lasted from 30 to 60 minutes, 
and was tape-recorded. The respondents had approved of this in advance. The interviews were 
carried out between the 3rd of November and the 21st of December 21st 2009. 
3.6 Data material and analysis  
Immediately after an interview was carried out the entire conversation was transcribed as 
accurately as possible. When all interviews were transcribed the material was divided 
thematically. The themes were rooted in the four problem areas developed to answer the 
research question, and they also provided the structural baseline of the interview guide. The 
coding and analysis techniques made use of in this study were developed according to the 
principles of Grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). These techniques provided a guide 
for defining meaning and developing categories.  
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The analysis was conducted thoroughly. The first step was to read the transcripts of all 13 
interviews to get an impression of what the material contained. Thereafter, in accordance with 
the guidelines of Grounded theory, each interview question was coded and meaningful 
thematic categories were developed on the basis of respondents’ answers. Each category was 
assigned a colour and the interview statements that matched the topics were coloured 
accordingly. On the basis of the categories some tables were developed to ensure a good 
overview of the results. At the end, tables and categories were translated to English and 
compared with statements in the transcriptions to make sure the meaning had not been altered.  
3.7 Credibility, confirmability and transferability 
According to Trochim (2001) three important criteria need to be fulfilled and thoroughly 
emphasised in a qualitative study: credibility, confirmability and transferability. 
 
Thagaard (2003) explains how the criterion of credibility in a qualitative study is concerned 
with the trustworthiness of a study, which can be strengthened if the researcher clearly 
distinguishes between information expressed in the research field and the researcher’s own 
evaluation of it. In an effort to obtain data free from my own assumptions all of the recorded 
interviews were transcribed word for word. In this report quotes and stated information were 
also translated to the best of my ability from Norwegian to English. According to Trochim, 
(2001) translation of collected data material always constitutes a challenge for the researcher 
as it may influence the credibility of the findings. By using some direct quotes when outlining 
the results after conducting the analysis, a clear distinction is made between respondents’ 
statements and my interpretations of them. My interpretations are presented as reflections or 
comments on the quotes and retellings, but are not detached from them. The direct quotes 
have been used within a thematic context as similar as possible to the one in the interviews. 
However, the included quotes have been selected and may therefore subjectively influence the 
results. Not all respondents are quoted on every topic, and on several occasions when 
interviewees mentioned the same concerns, they are cited as all or several. It is important to 
stress that consensus among the respondents is not an issue here. When interviewed all 
respondents had the opportunity to speak freely within the frames of the interview guide. 
Participants were informed in advance that they were granted full anonymity and the 
researcher made sure that videoconference interviews were not taped. In addition respondents 
were told they could withdraw from the interview at any time. 
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The criterion of confirmability denotes to what extent the researcher is able to be critical of 
their own interpretations and support from findings of other researchers. Several strategies are 
available for improving this criterion. For instance, one could document every procedure in 
order to monitor the data (Trochim, 2001). Consequently, the theoretical framework of this 
thesis seeks to provide solid and detailed information about central perspectives related to the 
research question of this thesis. Additionally, the method section focuses on systematic 
interpretations, especially regarding openness related to choices of process, method and 
conduct. A detailed monitoring of these aspects would strengthen the study’s confirmability 
(Trochim, 2001). 
 
Thagaard (2003) emphasises how the criterion of transferability refers to the interpretations 
developed within the frames of a given research project and how these may be relevant in 
another setting. As a researcher one has to ask oneself “To what extent does my result provide 
any meaning beyond the given circumstances of this particular study?” Even though the 
selection of respondents within this study has limitations it is possible to outline how these 
specific actors perceive risk of IO within the Norwegian oil and gas industry. Whether the 
participants of this study provide any general information on the subject matter, beyond what 
is true for them, is up for debate.  
3.8 Ethical considerations  
Prior to the interview respondents received information about their rights and the terms of 
participation. This was done through a written declaration of consent that accounted for the 
purpose of the study and explained how the collected data would be presented (see appendix 
1). All respondents signed the declaration and participated on the basis of voluntary, informed 
consent. According to NENT (2006) voluntary consent means that respondents participate 
without any external pressure or limitations on their free will. Silverman (2006) states 
informed consent means that participants have the right to know that they are being 
researched, the right to be informed about the nature of the study, and the right to withdraw 
from the study at any time. Thagaard (2003) emphasises how the foundation of any research 
study is the participants’ written consent. This will usually supersede any later denial of 
voluntary and informed consent. Another important ethical research principle outlined in 
NENT (2006) is the requirement of confidentiality. It states that those who agree to be 
scientific subjects have the right to know that all personal information that is revealed is 
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treated with total confidentiality. The research material needs to be completely anonymous 
and impossible to trace back to its originator/s.  
 
In this thesis all respondents are ensured full anonymity. In order to perform this guarantee 
the name, sex, age, place of residence, work site and specific information about work tasks, 
are not revealed. All of these aspects are considered to contain critical information that, if they 
were included, might diminish the participants’ anonymity. In an effort to distinguish 
interviewees while providing anonymity each respondent is given a random number from one 
to 13. For instance R2 means respondent two (see table 1 above). 
 
In the analysis it also felt natural to mention a person by gender. Therefore, respondents 
numbered R1 to R7 are referred to as him and those numbered R8 to R13 are referred to as 
her. These references do not represent the respondents’ actual gender. The decision is purely 
practical and a contributor to anonymity. According to The National Committee for Research 
Ethics in Science and Technology (2006) it is important that the researcher is aware of the 
scale of consequences participating in a study might have upon a respondent. Hence, the 
respondents’ were promised full anonymity. In Thagaard (2003) it is stressed that the 
interviewer should not claim possession and rights to audio recordings and transcribed data 
material for the foreseeable future. Therefore, the signed declaration of consent stated that the 
interview recordings will be used only for the original purpose and only the researcher will 
have access to them. Furthermore, it was stressed that the audio recordings, transcriptions, and 
notes will be destroyed when the thesis is submitted. 
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4. Results 
 
In this section, research findings from the conducted interviews will be outlined on the basis 
of hierarchic, thematic analysis of the interview transcriptions. The results will be presented 
through direct quotes and retellings of the respondents’ answers, as well as being compared 
and commented upon.  
4.1 Experts’ knowledge about integrated operations 
This subsection contains two parts. Initially, the four groups’ knowledge domains, in regard to 
integrated operations (IO), are presented. Next, the participants’ thoughts regarding 
possibilities and expectations of IO are given. 
4.5.1 Areas of expertise 
As pointed out in the theory section, the concept of IO is quite complex and the setting in 
which it appears and its use pretty much define what it means and what it constitutes. To fully 
understand the respondents’ perceptions of risk in relation to IO one needs to know what kind 
of experience and knowledge they possess about it. For this reason the IO expertise present in 
each of the four expert groups is outlined. 
  
Expert group A, industry, consists of four members. Two of them claimed to know a lot about 
HSE issues in relation to IO. They emphasised that they had gained their knowledge through 
work experience with IO. In addition, one of them claimed to possess IO knowledge in 
another area. He phrased it as follows:  
“My knowledge domain is mainly aimed at organising managements’ ways of working 
and how this contributes to the company’s IO work. I also work a lot with HSE in 
relation to IO, especially human factors within IO concerned with the construction of 
work sites” (R5, industry). 
 
The two remaining group members claimed to possess modest knowledge of IO because of 
limited relevant work experience. One respondent phrased it thus:  
“I don’t really know what my knowledge and experience within this area are. I know 
what I can within the business and risk management, but with regard to IO I’m not 
quite sure” (R8, industry). 
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The four group members’ statements reveal that each of them possesses different knowledge 
about IO. In addition, their work experiences with IO vary. Two of them are experienced, 
while the other two are inexperienced. 
 
In expert group B, researchers/professors, another pattern of expertise seems to be present 
among the three participants. All three mention that they have gained their knowledge through 
work experience with IO, but related to different factors. Moreover, their level of experience 
varied: high, general and low. The most experienced participant claimed to possess 
knowledge about equipment reliability and the required technology. In addition, he stated that 
he knew a lot about risk analysis and risk assessment applicable to the field of IO. The 
somewhat less experienced researcher claimed to possess more general IO knowledge related 
to organisational and security matters. The least experienced group member outlined his IO 
knowledge in the following way: 
“In fact, I have only heard integrated operations being mentioned and read 
descriptions of it. As a result I have very little specific knowledge about the exact 
systems used within IO” (R4, researcher). 
 
Based on the researchers/professors assertions their IO experience varies but they possess 
knowledge related to a number of different IO factors. 
  
In expert group C, supervisors, statements from the three group members revealed extensive 
knowledge and work experience with IO. One claimed to hold expertise in relation to 
operational systems that is essential in order to create IO. His expertise more specifically 
comprised data gathering, data information and data possessing systems concerning 
production and security. He further explained that the technical approach to this work was 
often referred to as managing security systems, including aspects involved in operation, 
maintenance and modification. One of the other group members claimed to know a lot about 
regulations concerning administrative IO responsibilities as well as the challenges that emerge 
when new systems are established, for instance integrity and robustness demands. The last 
member stated her IO expertise as follows: 
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“I am mainly involved in projects that report on integrated operations and examine 
tasks related to different problem areas. For instance, what solutions the industry 
chooses. I work mainly within the area of drilling and well18
 
” (R12, supervisor). 
The three supervisory respondents appear to have solid knowledge about IO, although they 
are in different areas of the industry.    
 
In expert group D, risk analysis consultants (RAC), all three group members stated that they 
possess knowledge in relation to the organisational challenges of IO. One of them outlined his 
familiarity with some IO work related to the possibilities of relocating control rooms onshore 
and risk aspects associated with this operation. In addition, he said he possessed some general 
knowledge on the human and organisational risk factors of IO. The next consultant outlined 
his areas of expertise that incorporated organisational work structure, work environment and 
communication between different disciplines in relation to IO. The third group member 
stated:  
“Most of the tasks I have performed have been concerned with organisational 
challenges related to IO, but this is very broad. I have been involved in everything 
from problem areas of HSE, risk assessments and risk analysis to more specific 
organisational development issues” (R9, RAC).  
 
In contrast to the other expert groups the risk analysis consultants appeared to be the only 
group in which all members hold IO expertise with some resemblance to each other. As the 
categorisation of expert groups is based on current place of work these results may denote that 
actors within this group have the least variation with regard to IO expertise. 
 
The respondents’ knowledge domains and experience with IO are quite different within each 
expert group. To get a general idea of the divergence within and between experts a chart has 
been outlined (see table 2). The four expert groups are presented in the rows, while areas of 
IO expertise are positioned in the columns. It is important to emphasise that respondents with 
little work experience in relation to IO (located in category 6) possess IO knowledge. For 
instance, they hold a great deal of expertise in areas that are essential to IO such as risk 
management, risk and reliability analysis. These participants are therefore considered relevant 
to this study.  
                                                 
 
 
18 Drilling and well refers to the process of drilling a hole in the seabed for the extraction of oil and gas (Aadnoy, 
Cooper, Miska, Mitchell and Payne, 2009).   
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4.1.2 Possibilities and expectations of integrated operations 
Based on the collected data, several positive IO beliefs where identified among the 
respondents. Possibilities of IO were generally perceived to occur within the six areas: 
finance, HSE, surveillance, operations, cooperation, expertise and decision-making. 
 
With regard to finance, five participants (one from industry, one supervisor and all 
consultants) mentioned how the implementation of IO can lead to financial growth/economic 
improvement within a number of petroleum companies. For instance, expenses might decrease 
as travelling can be reduced. Furthermore, new technology might reduce errors and 
maintenance problems, which in turn reduce costs. One of the participants’ explained it thus: 
”I guess IO have potential for reducing costs for the reason that one gets more real 
time information about the equipment and operational status, which again enables one 
to step in earlier” (R6, RAC).       
 
In relation to HSE, nine interviewees mentioned improvement possibilities regarding a 
number of safety aspects. Three of them (two industry members and one supervisor) pointed 
out how safety upsides would be achievable through IO. However, they failed to specify 
which industry areas or what elements of IO they had in mind. Four of the others (two 
researchers, one supervisor and one consultant) stressed how fewer offshore personnel on a 
rig, due to relocation onshore, can signify risk reduction because fewer people are exposed to 
hazards on the rig and/or in production. The consultant emphasised how real time data may 
improve risk assessment, as the ability to follow up the installation will improve with IO. One 
of the industry members mentioned how the development of common tools might help clarify 
risk setting when utilising IO. The other industry member made a comment regarding work 
environment:  
“I believe the new ways of working will result in increased well-being at work because 
human beings are most often social creatures and those who have succeeded with IO 
have got a very nice working environment” (R5, industry).   
 
The third area concerned surveillance. According to one industry member and one researcher 
IO might bring about tremendous surveillance improvements because better and constant 
supervision is possible. One of them stated: 
“With IO one gets a type of status, 24/7 surveillance, situated onshore, which haven’t 
been possible before, not even offshore. As a result the ability to sense what condition 
the installation is in has improved, contrary to earlier” (R7, industry).  
 
 
 
39 
 
4. Results 
The fourth area, operations, concerned possibilities of human, technical and organisational 
elements. Six respondents mentioned how remote operations and the use of real time data 
were likely to improve operational efficiency. Three of them (one industry member, one 
supervisor and one researcher) explained that onshore and offshore employees will experience 
increased work efficiency. The three other participants (one industry member, one researcher 
and one consultant) emphasised the prospect of increased operating efficiency of entire 
installations. One of the researchers elaborated as follows:  
“With IO one will probably get access to operating fields that were previously 
inaccessible. Additionally, one might operate fields more efficiently than before” 
(R13, researcher).    
 
Four participants drew attention to the fifth area, cooperation. Two of them (one industry 
member and one consultant) believed that IO will create closer dialogues between sea and 
shore, as well as across geographical borders. The two remaining respondents (two industry 
members) claimed new interactive and proactive work forms, like enhanced teamwork among 
interdisciplinary groups, would improve cooperation among different units. One of them 
elaborated: 
“If we do this correctly, I believe we will get a much better setting for collaboration 
between different disciplines and work centres” (R10, industry).    
 
The remaining areas, expertise and decision-making, have been combined as some responses 
refer to them jointly and others separately. Two interviewees (one from industry and one 
consultant) stated how real time data and new technology will increase expertise among 
offshore and onshore personnel. Five others (one from industry, one researcher, two 
supervisors and one consultant) emphasised how increased expertise and knowledge of IO 
will improve ability to get help when needed, for instance in decision-making. One of them 
expressed it thus:  
“IO will offer the possibility to get real time data onshore quicker, in order to provide 
offshore personnel with sufficient help and support in decision-making situations” 
(R12, Supervision). 
 
Findings from the interview study revealed that participants’ expectations towards IO varied 
from non-existent to sceptical and low to very high. Two respondents (one researcher and one 
supervisor) claimed not to have any expectations and two others (one from industry and one 
consultant) expressed scepticism towards whether or not IO have been thought through 
thoroughly. The consultant said:  
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“IO happens a bit too fast and maybe we haven’t thought enough about the purpose of 
it all” (R1, RAC). 
 
One of the researchers claimed to keep a personal distance to IO, but emphasised how she 
hoped it will be a success, without anything going wrong. Three other participants (two from 
industry and one consultant) expressed genuine optimism. The two industry members referred 
to IO as something they believe in and have a good feeling about. One of them referred to 
himself as an IO enthusiast. The consultant stated:  
“It is very exciting to think about how you can take something as firm and boring as 
offshore installations and suddenly alter and renew its ways. It is exciting to see what 
will happen, what the next step will be” (R9, RAC) 
 
In addition to the differentiation between negative, neutral and positive, expectations of IO 
some of the interviewees expressed their expectations about areas such as working 
environment, operating efficiency and security. The content of these IO expectations were 
comparable to the possibilities previously outlined. Three of the industry members held 
expectations regarding how IO will provide new and better ways of working together. Two 
participants (one industry member and one consultant) drew attention to the prospect of IO 
minimising geographical distance between a number of work sites by increasing the use of 
real time data, videoconferencing equipment, split computer screens and work spaces. They 
further emphasised how these elements will enable people to cooperate, get in touch with, as 
well as help each other more efficiently.  
 
Two interviewees (one from industry and one consultant) stressed how their expectations of 
IO focused on the possibility of increased operating efficiency. For instance, enhancing the 
uptake of natural recourses (oil and gas) by encouraging expertise in reservoirs, production, 
drilling and well to actively participate in decision-making. Furthermore, five participants 
spoke about their expectations of industrial security matters. Two of the industry members 
anticipated that IO would bring about a better security focus by developing new tools to 
improve the risk picture. One researcher hoped IO would enhance state surveillance. The 
remaining two (another industry member and a supervisor) anticipated HSE improvements in 
order to reduce the risk to personnel and installation; for example, accident reductions, fewer 
tool failures, less operation stops and fewer hiccups. In other words, regardless of some 
scepticism and concerns, IO were thought of as a changing possesses that hold a lot of 
possibilities and are the object of positive expectations. 
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4.2 Definitions of risk  
As Renn (2008) points out, the concept of risk is highly complex and much debated 
throughout academic, public and societal circles. The idea of risk might, in other words, differ 
at personal and professional levels. In order to describe the respondents’ perception of risk 
concerning integrated operations it is important to get an idea of how they comprehend risk in 
general. This subsection will outline how the different actors within the four expert groups 
defined risk. 
  
Within expert group A, industry, one of the respondents emphasised that, to him, risk is the 
probability of unwanted incidents, which may lead to human injuries or, in the worst-case, 
death, environmental damage, major accident emission or loss of assets. One of the other 
group members outlined a similar definition of risk: 
“What is the textbook definition? The probability of unwanted events and the 
magnitude of those unwanted events, as consequences, loss of personnel, materiel or 
economic values or damage to the environment” (R7, industry).    
 
The remaining two members also defined risk as probability times consequences. However, 
rather than elaborating on the definition they described a connection to their work tasks. In 
general, all four members expressed a rather similar definition of risk, and the elements 
chosen for elaborations are the only minor differences between the four statements.  
 
Within expert group B, researchers/professors, all three members referred to the general 
textbook definition of risk, stating concisely how they usually define risk as a combination of 
probability and consequences. However, one of them emphasised how the incident list was an 
important aspect of the risk definition. He elaborated that incident lists concerning all 
possible, unwanted events, including bow-ties19
 
 for each event, are essential in order to define 
risk. Furthermore, he stressed the simplicity of establishing probability and consequences if 
an incident list were developed. He added: 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
19 “A bow-tie model is a high-level modelling for risk analysis –combining the results from fault tree analysis 
and event tree analysis in order to explicitly establish the cause/effect relations related to unbiased events” 
(Nordgård, 2008, p.2)  
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“As I see it, the incident list is what creates most of the uncertainty because it is so 
difficult to include all of the possible events that can happen, and do damage, on it. 
Very often one has forgotten parts of it’’…. ’’ If you look into an accident investigation 
very often it states that this particular incident was not thoroughly covered by the risk 
analysis done in advance. It was simply forgotten” (R3, researcher).  
 
Overall, the three researchers’ showed consensus in risk definitions. 
 
Within expert group C, supervisors, one respondent referred to risk as probability times 
consequences. He explained how the frequency or probability of a hazard is found through 
empirical data or analysis. The hazard’s characteristics furthermore determine which 
consequences will occur. Another member stated: 
“There are several academic spins on it, but to my mind, risk is the correlation 
between probability that an event will occur and its consequences” (R11, supervisor). 
 
The third supervisor defined risk as an ambiguous concept. On the one hand, it can be 
calculated by the use of risk analysis, such as are we above or below the accepted risk 
criterion. However, on the other hand, risk is experienced and alters from person to person, 
based on, for example, work tasks, social environment or educational background. In general, 
all three members acknowledged the textbook definition of risk. Yet, two of them viewed the 
concept as complex and one emphasised experienced risk as significant.  
 
In expert group D, risk analysis consultants (RAC), only one member solely defined risk as 
probability times consequences. The two remaining consultants portrayed more complex 
definitions. One of them defined risk like this:  
“The easiest I guess, is to say it is a combination of probability and consequence. This 
is the traditional definition, but you can of course outline its nuances by making a 
distinction between experienced risk and real risk. However, risk is concerned with 
what will happen, how probable is it that this will happen, and what the consequences 
will be like?” (R6, RAC). 
 
The other consultant also said it is usual to defined risk as probability times consequences. 
However, she emphasised that to her, risk is a lot of things and the technical definition is just 
one way of looking at it. Experienced risk, like individual levels of uncertainty, environmental 
risks, such as pollution and major organisational accidents were mentioned as other types of 
risk. In essence, she believed all of these three areas to be central and serious aspects of risk. 
Overall, all three consultants referred to the textbook definition of risk. However, two of them 
claimed the concept to be complex and stressed experienced risk as influential in a definition.  
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Table 3 illustrates the participants’ risk definitions in such a manner that comparisons 
between and within expert groups are possible. The rows hold the four different expert 
groups, while the columns present two categorisations of risk definitions. The first category 
contains the majority of the interviewees and explicitly defines risk with regard to the 
common ‘textbook’ definition of probability times consequences (expected value theory20
 
). 
The second category holds a more complex definition of risk, where the expected value is 
complemented by experienced risk. In general all 13 respondents mentioned how risk usually 
was defined as probability times consequences, while three of them additionally referred to 
experienced risk as a central element when defining risk.  
Table 3. This table outlines how the 13 experts who participated in this study define risk, both 
within and across expert groups. 
Group: 1. Mentions the general ‘textbook’ 
definition (expected value) 
2. Mentions both calculated and 
experienced risk 
Expert group A: 
Industry 
R5, R7, R8 and R10: Risk is the 
probability times consequences. 
 
Expert group B: 
Researchers/Professors 
R3, R4 and R13: Risk is mainly the 
probability times consequences. 
 
Expert group C: 
Supervisors 
 
R2 and R11: Risk is often viewed as 
the probability times consequences. 
R12: Risk is divided in two. It can be 
calculated by risk analysis, but then 
there is experienced risk that is 
different from person to person. 
Expert group D: Risk 
analysis consultants 
(RAC) 
R1: Most often views risk as 
probability times consequences. 
R6: Risk is a function of probability 
times consequences, but also one’s 
individual experience of it. 
R9: Risk can be technical, experienced 
and environmental. 
 
4.3 Hazard and vulnerabilities of integrated operations  
This subsection outlines which hazards21 and vulnerabilities22
  
 the participants believe 
integrated operations (IO) might create, but since the concepts were used inconsistently by 
some of the respondents, they have been united and portrayed as synonyms. 
                                                 
 
 
20 Theory about expected value originates from an approach on risky choices based on psychophysical analysis 
of responses to money and probability. This psychophysical approach can be traced to an essay by Daniel 
Bernoulli published in 1738 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). 
21 See section 1 for definition of hazard. 
22 See section 1 for definition of vulnerability. 
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When talking about a specific hazard or vulnerability it is important to know which IO setting 
it occurs within, as this influences and determines them. One participant called attention to 
this fact when he stated: 
”Hazards have to be measured according to the level of IO and how much you depend 
on it”…. “The mildest forms of IO may, for example, be the use of video conferencing 
equipment, and an extreme form is to move important, vital functions onshore, and 
maybe even abroad’’ (R11, supervisor). 
  
The majority of hazards and vulnerabilities mentioned by the respondents are linked to the 
full range IO settings, which involves remote operations, relocation of control rooms and 
relocation/reduction of personnel.  
 
Findings from the interview study identified several hazards and vulnerabilities that may 
come about as a result of the implementation of IO, resulting in these seven main categories: 
a) human characteristics, b) management, c) decision-making, d) knowledge and competence, 
e) communication and cooperation, f) dependence, g) system complexity and h) security. 
 
In category a), human characteristics, five different hazards/vulnerabilities were identified. 
Six respondents (one from industry, two researchers, one supervisor and two consultants), 
stated lack of hands-on feeling as a sever hazard/vulnerability of IO. The consultant offered 
the following explanation: 
“By not being offshore but onshore, you lose important hands-on feeling. If something 
explodes you are not able to hear it, or go outside and check if a pump is hot or 
making a weird noise” (R1, RAC). 
 
Two other participants (industry members) mentioned lack of overview as a negative aspect of 
IO. They believe that remote operations will result in problems concerning who is doing what, 
and hence a clear overview will be difficult to maintain. A consultant stated lack of personnel 
supervision, as another hazard/vulnerability of IO. He said: 
“By moving control rooms onshore, you will not be able to see what condition control 
room personnel are in, and you therefore lose a sense of what is happening amongst 
the personnel, at their personal, individual levels” (R9, RAC). 
 
A supervisor drew attention to altered risk experience as a potential hazard/vulnerability of 
IO. She expressed a strong concern about how the risk experiences among offshore personnel 
left on the installations will change, because with the use of remote operations those capable 
of shutting down the rig will be so far away. While an industry member claimed increased 
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trust to be a major hazard/vulnerability of IO, because relocated personnel onshore will be 
unable to see things for themselves, so they have to rely on what others tell them.  
 
Category b), management, merely contains one hazard/vulnerability of IO. According to an 
industry member increased workload might become a sever hazard of IO. He said:  
“As a result of management’s way of organising entire companies may experience a 
more intense way of working and increased workload, with the prospect of exhaustion 
and/or burnout” (R5, industry). 
 
In category c), decision-making, two different hazards/vulnerabilities of IO are outlined. A 
consultant found offshore personnel’s decision-making to be a hazard/vulnerability of IO. He 
claimed: 
“With IO there will be fewer people present on the installations to make decisions on 
about the rig” (R6, RAC). 
 
In contrast, one supervisor mentioned onshore personnel’s decision-making:  
“Onshore personnel may be biased by the fact that they are distant from many 
operations, which might result in them making different decisions than they would had 
they been offshore” (R12, supervisor). 
  
Category d), knowledge and competence, holds seven different hazards/vulnerabilities. Two 
participants (one industry member and one consultant) believe remote operations cause 
unfortunate situations regarding information utilization. The industry member elaborated his 
concern the following way: 
“I keep thinking about the fact that, what if one is not able to use the available 
information in a good enough manner? In production management, for instance, one 
does not have well modelling and reservoirs capable of picking up/being interactive 
with the information flow that is coming in” (R5, industry) 
 
Another industry member expressed an apprehension towards IO regarding information 
availability:  
“In most cases I would claim that an increase in available knowledge would reduce 
the probability of accidents, but now, with IO, I believe it will in some cases originate 
unfortunate consequences” (R7, Industry). 
 
Furthermore, one of the industry participants assumed lack of knowledge about tools and 
colleagues might become a hazard/vulnerability of IO given that personnel are removed. A 
consultant believed shifts in knowledge will create hazards/vulnerabilities: 
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“When a lot of personnel are relocated onshore, the theoretical competence becomes 
important, while practical knowledge and skills are superfluous” (R6, RAC). 
 
Furthermore, one consultant feared IO will lead to inexperienced personnel running the 
installations, while yet another mentioned how he feared IO may create too specialised 
disciplines, which will be incapable of understanding each other. One of the supervisors was 
concerned with expert dependability and competence dependability as two possible 
hazards/vulnerabilities of IO. With regard to the first aspect he stated:  
“Today are we dependent on a lot of different actors, like system delivery personnel, 
etc. Since no one has all the competence, because it has become too complex, you need 
a specialist for everything, and that is a vulnerability of IO” (R2, Supervisor). 
 
With regard to the second aspect he said: 
“It is important to have the right people, with the right minds, in the right place at the 
right time. Because in the borderline between suppliers and operations the 
competence dependability is increasing” (R2, supervisor). 
 
In category e), communication and cooperation, three hazards/vulnerabilities of IO were 
outlined. Two industry members assumed IO will create hazards/vulnerabilities such as lack 
of face-to-face communication. One of them stated the following: 
“By removing personnel we lose the human face-to-face communication and that is 
scary. I am fundamentally convinced that people need to talk together, to sit in 
different virtual spaces solving tasks” (R10, Industry).  
 
Two other participants (one industry member and one researcher) emphasised the fact that too 
many actors involved in the same operations will inhibit cooperation and create serious 
misunderstandings. The last hazard/vulnerability of category d, interface, were drawn 
attention to by a supervisor expressed her concern as follows: 
“Having a holistic approach of how to plan and carry out operations is vital because 
there are a lot of suppliers that have to talk together and tools that need to be 
correctly connected. If the interfaces are not maintained, barriers that supposedly 
should work will not be good enough, and that might cause major problems” (R12, 
supervisor). 
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In category f), dependence23
 “I think there are a couple of ditches one might walk into by relying more and more 
on ICT tools, which we might not know the consequences of yet” (R10, Industry). 
, three hazards/vulnerabilities were pointed out by the 
respondents. Four participants (one from industry, two researchers and one consultant) 
expressed concerns regarding ICT reliability. The industry participant said: 
 
With regard to the second area of concern, system uptime24
“The most extreme hazard of IO is to move important, central elements onshore, 
maybe even abroad. With vital elements gone you are dependent on constant system 
uptime being 100%” (R11, supervisor). 
, one supervisor uttered the 
following statement: 
 
With reference to the third area, fibre optic25
“Due to automatic processes people forget their knowledge about general tasks, and 
vulnerability is then connected to the fact that one is dependent on decisions-makers 
on shore, who again are dependent on fibre optics in order to get the process 
working” (R7, Industry).  
 dependency, one industry member claimed: 
 
In relation to category g), system complexity, five hazards/vulnerabilities of IO were 
mentioned: barrier loss, system complexity, increased uncertainty, errors and organisational 
halt. With reference to barrier loss, a supervisor exclaimed:  
“The use of high range IO may result in partial or total barrier loss. The reason being 
that common elements such as joint communication lines/systems and computer 
systems appear within the structure, so control over technological and organisational 
aspects within the factory will be difficult to maintain” (R2, supervisor). 
 
One of the researchers uttered a concern regarding how system complexity in general may 
constitute a hazard/vulnerability. For instance, in relation to maintenance personnel who meet 
partially unfamiliar environment. The risk they are exposed to may increase since they are 
inexperienced with the system, such as lacking knowledge of where lifeboats are situated, and 
where to run if something happens.  
 
                                                 
 
 
23 Dependence is a translation of the Norwegian word avhengighet (Krikeby, 2003, p. 799). 
24 Part of active time during which an equipment, machine, or system is either fully operational or is ready to 
perform its intended function. Opposite of downtime (Business dictionary, 2010, Uptime).  
25 “Fibre optics enables the data transmission rate to exceed that of electrical transmission, and the weight and 
dimensions of the cable are minimized, reducing the effect on shipping weights and pressure drop through the 
coil” (Retalic, Laird, and MacLeod, 2009, p. 775).    
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Another researcher mentioned increased uncertainty as another hazards/vulnerability of IO, 
because when elements of uncertainty are introduced in a complex system the vulnerability 
increases. Two participants (one researcher and one supervisor) emphasised that increased 
system complexity will entail more errors, which constitute a hazard/vulnerability of IO. 
Operational halts were mentioned by a researcher as a hazard/vulnerability of IO. He stated: 
“Whit increased ICT system complexity one will become more vulnerable to 
operational halts” (R3, researcher). 
 
In category h), security, three hazards/vulnerabilities were identified: information security, 
hackers and the unexpected. Concerning information security one member of industry 
claimed:  
“The biggest hazard of IO will be information security and information security 
problems, mostly when using real time data, since a huge amount of information is 
being transferred and unforeseen errors may occur” (R5, Industry).  
 
Four interviewees (one form industry, two researchers and one supervisor) drew attention to 
hackers as a major hazard/vulnerability of IO. One of the researchers said:  
“One of the greatest hazards of IO are if intruders, hackers, or other unwanted people 
get access to, or manage to break into the computer systems of IO” (R4, researcher). 
 
The third hazard/vulnerability in relation to security, the unexpected, was also mentioned by a 
researcher. She elaborated as follows: 
“With technical operational aspects of IO one may become very vulnerable if one is 
not prepared for unexpected events, inflicted from the outside” (R13, researcher). 
 
Overall, numerous hazards and vulnerabilities were mentioned, concerning many aspects and 
changes related to IO. Moreover, most of the presumed hazards/vulnerabilities are related to 
extreme IO aspects like remote operations, remote control rooms and relocation of offshore 
personnel onshore. In order to get an overview of the stated hazards and vulnerabilities of IO, 
table 4 was put together. The left column of the table presents the main categories, whereas 
the right column outlines all of the hazards/vulnerabilities mentioned and clarifies which 
circumstances the respondents believe them to be situated in.  
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4.4 Major accidents and integrated operations 
This subsection will outline the participants’ risk perception in relation to major accidents and 
IO. Five various areas will be covered. Initially, general concerns regarding major accidents 
are cited. Next, known and unknown risk aspects are mapped out. Then, opinions on feared 
magnitude of major accidents by IO are addressed. Thereafter the interviewees’ thoughts 
regarding increased demands on ICT and the hazard of major accidents due to IO are 
emphasised. Lastly, the probability of a major accident occurring during the first ten years of 
using IO is presented. 
4.4.1 General concerns regarding major accidents 
Findings from the interview study reveal many and varying opinions on whether major 
accidents are a likely hazard of IO. Three respondents (one researcher, one supervisor and one 
consultant) believed that IO will increase the probability of major accidents. According to the 
consultant, consequences of necessary IO changes that have not been examined enough might 
arise. Therefore, it may very well increase the hazard of major accidents. The researcher 
worried that IO would increase material damage and enhance pollution. The supervisor 
elaborated: 
“I believe there is a possibility of increased risk of major accidents if IO are 
introduced without being thoroughly planned. One has to think about all the systems 
and the interdependences, if not, one is unable to identify challenges or problems that 
may occur again and create major accidents” (R12, Supervisor). 
 
Four participants (one researcher, two supervisors and one consultant) pointed out how 
utilising IO would have no effect on the risk of major accidents. However, IO might create 
challenges or problems due to increased system complexity. Their explanations as to why 
differed. One of the supervisors believed security problems will increase. The consultant said 
one’s opportunity to prevent a hazard on the rig will be lessened because personnel are 
situated onshore. The other supervisor thought reduction of offshore personnel may alter their 
understanding and experience of risk and create new challenges. The researcher said: 
“There is hardly any reason to believe the risk of accidents will be greater with IO 
than traditional operations, but it might be different. It may be other elements that 
cause it, not necessarily different types of consequences” (R13, researcher). 
 
The six remaining respondents (four industry members, one researcher and one consultant) 
believed IO will contribute to diminishing the risk of major accidents. One of the industry 
members stated the following: 
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“If one manages to use IO as a tool in order to simplify and strengthen the 
relationship between disciplines onshore and disciplines offshore, and accordingly 
help each other, I think it will contribute to decreased major accidents” (R8, 
industry). 
  
The others also expressed positive attitudes and referred to IO as a preventative measure. The 
consultant stated that IO will help operating centres maintain better control. The remaining 
industry member said IO will empower monitoring, surveillance, supervision, control and 
maintenance, which might help discover, for example leakages, much earlier.  
4.4.2 Known or unknown risk aspects 
The respondents’ opinions varied with regard to the extent to which any risk of major 
accidents by IO is known or unknown within the industry. One of the researchers claimed: 
“Whether major accidents will have a higher frequency after the implementation of 
IO, I don’t know. I think the consequences of major accidents will probably be smaller 
after implementing IO since the exposure of humans will decrease” (R4, researcher).  
 
With regard to the same aspect, one industry member emphasised that in order to say anything 
specific on the subject matter IO need to be implemented and used for a while. Six 
participants (two industry members, three supervisors and one consultant) considered the risk 
of major accidents by IO to be well known within the industry. An industry member 
elaborated: 
“IO are not something that is separate, but they are being integrated into the everyday 
business. Thus, I believe it will not increase the risk of major accidents but rather be a 
helpful tool that prevents major accidents from happening” (R5, industry). 
 
Nonetheless, some of them expressed a couple of concerns. The consultant believed offshore 
personnel lack knowledge of how major accidents originate and how individuals may 
contribute in creating or preventing them. One of the supervisors stated that although system 
complexity might alter with IO, due to increased uncertainty aspects, this is only a minor 
obstacle and not something that will cause major accidents. Another supervisor claimed: 
“My impression is that in some environments IO are very well known, but different 
companies have different visions about what they want out of IO and what IO actually 
are. So my impression is that one has different competences depending on where in the 
system one is sitting/working” (R12, supervisor). 
  
Five respondents (one industry member, two researchers and two consultants) mentioned how 
the risk of major accidents caused by IO is not thoroughly known by the industry. In addition, 
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one of the industry members stressed that the hazard’s extent is unknown. The two 
researchers said that whether major accidents will increase or decrease by using IO is not 
thoroughly known by the industry yet, because as long as several aspects of IO remain hidden, 
the magnitude of it is unclear. The consultant stated: 
“My impression is that there is not enough focus on major accidents today, and I 
guess not in relation to IO either. We are good at focusing on the little incidents, but 
maybe not enough on how they might develop into bigger accidents, which I believe it 
is not well enough known, or focused upon” (R6,RAC). 
4.4.3 Feared magnitude (worst-case scenarios) 
In this part feared magnitude of a major accident while utilising integrated operations (IO), 
are presented. Feared magnitude will denote worst possible consequences of a major accident. 
The following opinions were expressed: 
 
 A consultant believed worst-case scenarios of major accidents using IO would entail solely 
environmental aspects. He reasoned that since IO reduce the number of personnel offshore the 
severity of major accidents will be greater with regard to the environment and the rig itself. A 
researcher was unsure as to whether the use of IO will enhance or reduce the occurrence of 
major accidents, but he assumed the consequences would diminish, as less offshore personnel 
will be exposed to hazards. Seven interviewees (four industry members, two supervisors and 
one consultant) believed the magnitude of major accidents will stay the same and not change 
due to IO. All seven referred to installations, personnel and finance as the three main losses of 
major accidents. One of the supervisors elaborated:  
”The worst consequence is of course a lot of casualties. I do not fear anything new, 
beyond what we know of today, such as collision with huge vessels, deliberate actions 
by on-/ offshore personnel, or terror threat. Other than that it is the traditional major 
accident such as construction failure, installation collapse, major gas or oil spillage 
that may cause explosions and of course environmental destruction” (R11, 
supervisor).   
 
Four interviewees (two researchers, one supervisor and one consultant) found it impossible to 
comment upon this question. However, the consultant mentioned that in theory, the potential 
for major accidents could decrease as IO would improve the monitoring influencing factors. 
4.4.4 Increased demands on information and communication technology 
With regard to increased demand on information and communication technology (ICT) by IO 
and the risk of major accidents, the participants stated positive, negative, neutral and 
sometimes complex outlooks.  
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Three of the supervisors believed the increased demands on ICT by IO to be positive, and not 
impose the risk of major accidents. One of them mentioned that ICT demands could create a 
more complex system for personnel in charge of the infrastructure, but claimed that firm 
system security levels and system uptime would be easy to uphold. Another supervisor 
claimed that the demands on ICT had always been present, and the only thing that had 
changed was people’s awareness of it. Moreover, she acknowledged it might be challenging 
to preserve personnel’s awareness of ICT, as it becomes the central element of the sector to a 
much greater extent than before IO. The third supervisor viewed ICT as very important in 
developing strict industrial requirements that the entire business can agree upon. She believed 
mutual standards and requirements between operators, suppliers and authorities may enhance 
cooperation. Additionally, rules and regulations need to be adapted, to fit the challenges and 
possibilities that IO might inflict. Two interviewees (one researcher and one consultant) 
expressed multifaceted attitudes. The consultant claimed that on the one hand technical 
reliable systems had several positive aspects as they would contain all necessary information. 
However, on the other hand, he was worried about the systems influence the on petroleum 
personnel. The researcher stated the following: 
”It consists of both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand you have a better 
data foundation, better overview and monitors, which decrease the risk. Then, on the 
other hand you become more dependent on systems that can be vulnerable with regard 
to terrorism, sabotage or other stuff” (R13, researcher).  
  
Apprehensions with regard to increased risk of system halt26
 
 and hackers were highlighted by 
some of the interviewees. A researcher stated that he was afraid it would become easier to 
find errors within ICT systems. Continuously, he feared this might result in an enhanced risk 
of someone managing to break in and do damage and create major accidents. An industry 
member drew attention to information security aspects when he claimed the following:  
“The media portrays risk aspects of major accidents with regard to relocation of work 
tasks and confusion regarding who does what as the biggest hazards, but I do not 
believe the hazards are there at all. I believe that errors in connection to information 
security will occur when different programs are connected. I actually believe this is 
the main challenge with integrated operations and major accidents” (R5, industry). 
 
                                                 
 
 
26 System halt is the rare case when a system encounters a non-recoverable error and the only recourse is to halt 
the system (Microsoft, 2010). 
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A consultant claimed that a connection between the two subject areas in question were 
lacking, and stressed that if an operation loses ICT it depends on in order to be carried out, 
one will have redundancy in shutting down the operation. However, five other respondents 
(three industry members, one researcher and one consultant) viewed ICT dependability of IO 
as a severe threat causing major accidents. Two of the industry members specified what kind 
on ICT dependability they had in mind. One of them drew attention to fibre optic cables:  
”I believe fibre optic fall out will have severe consequences today because it has 
become more complex and difficult to pursue. It is easy to imagine how an error made 
in one place can have really large consequences somewhere else” (R7, industry). 
 
The other industry member mentioned bandwidth capacity and speed: 
”I believe the bandwidth is a challenge because in some waters nothing other than 
satellites will function, and they have limitations. So that is a limitation of IO” (R8, 
industry). 
 
4.4.5 Will disaster strike?  
The last part is concerned with the respondents’ opinions on the prospect of major accidents 
happening within the first ten years of utilising IO. Six interviewees (two industry members, 
one researcher, two supervisors and one consultant) responded rather modestly and claimed 
they were unable to provide an answer. One of the researchers stated the following:  
”I am in no position to say anything about that because I do not know anything about 
these details” (R3, researcher). 
 
Four of the other respondents (two researchers, one supervisor and one consultant) found the 
probability of major accidents occurring, after the implementation of IO is completed, to be 
very small. One of the researchers claimed that the probability of major accidents happening 
will not increase because IO are implemented. Equally, the consultant stated that nothing will 
happen during the first ten years. However, by looking across a thousand or ten thousand 
years, then maybe something would happen. The supervisor believed the probability would be 
less than 10 minus 4 (i.e. one in 10,000). The remaining three industry members saw the 
probability of major accidents as decreasing when IO are fully implemented. One of them 
said: 
”I do not think it will become worse, rather the opposite. Integrated operations are 
being implemented in order to improve the industry and reduce the probability of 
major accidents happening. If there were the slightest belief that it could go the other 
way we would never do it” (R8, industry).   
 
 
55 
 
4. Results 
4.5 Risk management and integrated operations 
In this subsection the following three areas are mapped out: a) the respondents’ beliefs 
regarding the requirement of an information and communication technology (ICT) specific 
defined situations of hazards and accidents (DSHA); b) what challenges the actors believe IO 
may impose on the industry in relation to risk management; c) suggestions on what can be 
done to improve risk management following IO implementation. 
4.5.1 ICT-specific DSHA  
Risk management within the petroleum sector has a proactive focus that revolves around 
barriers and barriers thinking. With the implementation of IO questions regarding the 
necessity of developing ICT-specific DSHA have arisen. Generally, the participants’ opinions 
on this subject matter consisted of pros, cons and uncertainties.  
 
Eight interviewees (two industry members, two researchers, four supervisors, and one 
consultant) believed that creating ICT-specific DSHA would be a positive contribution to the 
industry’s existing barriers. One of the supervisors stated: 
“If you want to be in control you need to know about hazards and you need to prepare 
for them. Developing ICT-specific DSHA is something I believe will benefit these 
objectives, and during the process you will manage to identify new critical areas. A 
process that identifies hazard elements is important and a DSHA may be such a 
process” (R2, supervisor). 
 
All eight respondents mentioned the sectors increasing dependency on ICT as the main reason 
for needing to develop ICT-specific DSHA. One of the industry members stressed: 
“What used to be ‘nice to have’ is today a ‘must have’, such as bandwidth and 
connection between sea and shore via computers. They are vital in order to get 
updates” (R8, industry). 
 
One of the supervisors argued that petroleum companies rarely reported ICT incidents before, 
but since the implementation of IO started more and more ICT reports has been filed. 
Additionally, she thought several oil and gas companies have started to shape ICT-specific 
DSHA, with the intention of creating better tools for readiness analysis, and implement them 
into ordinary training and incident thinking. One of the industry members elaborated how 
ICT-specific DSHA probably would be very relevant and useful with regard to today’s 
readiness aspects of IO, since remote operations enhance the interfaces among offshore and 
onshore sites. Nevertheless, she claimed that she would rather see ICT aspects incorporated 
into pre-excising DSHA than new ones being developed. One of the other consultants 
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believed there will be no need for ICT-specific DSHA, without offering any specific 
explanation as to why. Similar notions were expressed by two other interviewees (one 
consultant and one industry member). They portrayed ICT broadness which covers aspects 
such as rupture of fibre optic cables, viruses, alarm stop, and system loss, the explanation for 
their beliefs. Subsequently, they assumed that ICT-specific DSHA would be nearly 
impossible to produce. The consultant elaborated: 
“It is situation dependent. Whether it is in relation to the use of videoconferencing 
equipment or running a control room are two different situations. If DSHA are needed 
they have to be much more specific about what they embrace than just ICT” (R1, 
RAC). 
 
Three other interviewees (one industry member, one researcher and one consultant) were 
uncertain about the subject in question. The industry member thought developing ICT specific 
DSHA sounded logical as IO incorporate new technology that enhances organisational 
complexity 
4.5.2 Challenges of risk management due to IO 
On the subject of risk management and IO all of the respondents mentioned challenges in 
relation to man, technology or organisation (MTO). A supervisor mentioned cross-
disciplinary communication as a risk management challenge of IO. He stated that by using IO 
disciplines that seldom communicate, such as ICT and automation, will need to be in 
continuous dialogue. Consequently, they will find a common way of communicating to 
maintain a good risk management process. Two respondents (one industry member and one 
consultant) mentioned the introduction of new subjects and work processes as a risk 
management challenge in relation to how risk analysts might face unfamiliar settings they 
have no prior knowledge of. One of the supervisors drew attention to aspects of remote 
operations as risk management challenges, such as competence and knowledge about the rig, 
equipment and colleagues. Moreover, a researcher pointed out how increased system 
complexity might become a risk management challenge of IO as it influences employees’ use 
of new risk analysis or maintenance staff training. Equally, one industry member found the 
designing of risk analysis and tool developing, suited for different operator phases, to be risk 
management challenges of IO. 
 
Some of the stated risk management challenges were related to human interaction, which is 
difficult to identify, yet essential in order to maintain a good organisational setting. For 
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instance a consultant claimed interrelated human aspects to be the biggest area of concern, 
and not ICT aspects like system reliability and availability which the industry focuses on. One 
of the supervisors believed making sure employees’ risk understanding is adequate is a risk 
management challenge. A researcher stated the following challenge:  
”It is mostly that one has to think in new and unfamiliar ways”….”You need to reset 
your way of thinking within some areas. Perhaps even be aware that new problems, 
that one hasn’t considered might yet arise” (R13, researcher).   
 
In contrast to the previously mentioned risk management challenges, related to MTO, some 
respondents had other opinions. An industry member explained how the implementation of IO 
was, to him, just the same as any other new project related to change. He said: 
”I think about IO the same way as any alteration projects within an oil company. They 
should be managed in the same manner. It is not a special issue” (R5, industry). 
 
Two other interviewees (one researcher and one consultant) stated that IO would not create 
any risk management challenges. The researcher said that the introduction of IO would 
require some new systems. Furthermore, to get the same surveillance barriers as before IO 
will require thorough analysis in advance. However, he saw no reason to be concerned about 
anything going wrong and thus creating new risk management challenges. According to the 
consultant there will be no risk management challenges as IO enable the industry to manage 
risk better, since barriers will become more visible, available and easier to control. 
4.5.3 Improvement suggestions on risk management following IO 
Several of the researchers claimed they had no risk management propositions, but one 
industry member expressed a hoped that IO would enable the industry to see trends earlier, in 
order to act upon them. A consultant suggested that increased attention, more formalised 
structure and formal meeting areas might improve the risk management of IO. He elaborated: 
“I think one has not thought enough about IO as an issue yet, so that needs to be the 
first step. One has to get people to realise that these things influence risk. It can be 
managed by getting a more formalised structure and formal meeting areas. The 
familiar stuff needs to be replaced by something that is just as good” (R1, RAC). 
 
Equally, one of the researchers suggested that increased awareness among personnel might 
improve risk management. Three other respondents (one industry member, one supervisor and 
one consultant) mentioned how cross-disciplinary communication and sharing of experiences 
might improve risk management. Additionally, the consultant suggested that cross-
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disciplinary sharing of knowledge should be incorporated in DSHA readiness planning. The 
two others made these suggestions: 
”Different disciplines have to talk more and share experiences, for instance between 
suppliers and operators. The dependability elements need to be acknowledged and one 
might have to find new ways in which to work together that enables one to know what 
others are doing” (R2, supervisor). 
 
”I believe a closer dialogue between shore, sea and sub-suppliers could help us 
identify the problem areas, be closer and more hands on” (R8, industry). 
  
Two industry members suggested that the best way to improve risk management would be to 
develop tools and methods that acknowledge the importance of human and organisational 
aspects. The industry member stated: 
“One needs to develop tools and methods that measure the quality of soft safety 
barriers to get a better organisational understanding about the fact that technological 
aspects are not necessarily the only concern any more” (R7, industry). 
 
A supervisor mentioned that she would have liked to see the supervisors become more visible 
with regard to discipline follow-ups just as the work in other supervision sectors are 
conducted. Another supervisor claimed that the most efficient way to manage risk would be to 
know what you want with IO in advance; to have a solid plan that identifies what it is one 
seeks to achieve with IO.  
  
With regard to whether risk management related to IO is being adequately managed, five 
respondents (two industry members, one researcher, one supervisor and one consultant) 
claimed they were not sure. Four other respondents (one industry member, one supervisor and 
two consultants) said it was not. They all believed more could be done with regard to 
unforeseen obstacles and ways to improve barrier indicators. The supervisor elaborated: 
”I believe more can be done, and that we have a job to do in relation to the overall 
picture. We see examples of this with regard to drilling and well, that more and more 
equipment is becoming web based, both from the seabed and up on the installation, 
which may constitute a challenge. I don’t think enough is being done there” (R12, 
supervisor). 
 
Another supervisor expressed scepticism and stated that it would be dependent on which 
industrial sub-cultures one had in mind. An industry member believed enough is being done. 
However, he was not sure how efficient it all was. He elaborated:  
“Many rules that have to be obeyed are developed for specific situations that are not 
necessarily relevant any more. Therefore, one keeps doing unnecessary risk analysis 
sometimes” (R7, industry). 
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4.6 Summary of the main findings  
How do actors from different expert groups perceive risk and risk management in 
relation to petroleum production in an integrated operations environment?  
 
In general, the research findings imply that risk is perceived differently and independently of 
the distribution across expert groups. Moreover, the most important finding in relation to 
experts’ knowledge about integrated operations revealed that the 13 respondents hold varying 
IO knowledge, within and across expert groups. The research findings also indicate that 
possibilities and expectations of IO can be associated with areas like finance, HSE, 
surveillance, operations, cooperation, expertise and decision-making. The key findings 
concerning definitions of risk imply that the respondents have a common risk definition, from 
the engineering science of expected value (EV).  
 
The main finding with regard to hazards and vulnerabilities of integrated operations indicates 
that in the interface between man and technology various risks might occur. Risk related to 
aspects such as human characteristics, management, decision-making, knowledge and 
competence, communication and cooperation, dependence, system complexity and security. 
The primary finding in relation to major accidents and integrated operations is that 
interviewees hold varying beliefs regarding whether or not there is a link between the two 
factors. Moreover, the risk of major accidents is mainly believed to diminish with IO but 
should it occur, consequences are believed to similar as to prior major accidents. The findings 
also revealed several important concerns, including apprehensions regarding how the causes 
of major accidents are not thoroughly know among personnel, and that ICT complexity might 
bring about the risk of sever security problems. 
 
The main finding for risk management and integrated operations denotes that factors in 
relation to man, technology and organisation are challenges that need to be acknowledged in 
order to bring about improvements. Additionally, the findings indicate that ICT-specific 
DSHA following IO are considered useful, and uncertainty towards if enough is being done to 
manage risk following IO flourish.  In that respect, numerous risk management suggestions 
were stated like sharing of knowledge and experience, tool creation, enhancing  the focus on 
interfaces between human and organization, as well as encourage supervisors to become more 
visible.  
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5. Discussion 
The main contribution of the research findings is detailed information about how 13 actors in 
relation to the petroleum sector at the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) perceive risk and 
risk management. However, there is a question whether the results are adequate and of 
sufficient quality to answer the research question? In order to find out, methodological 
reflection, central aspects and new areas of concern need to be considered. At the end of this 
section, implications for further research and an overall conclusion will be stated.  
5.1 Methodological reflections 
Three central methodological aspects need to be discussed in order to say anything about the 
quality of the findings.  
 
Credibility: are the research findings credible? Since the concept of credibility in a qualitative 
study refers to how trustworthy the conducted research is (Thagaard, 2003) aspects that could 
influence the concept need to be considered. One aspect that might have influenced the 
findings credibility is the use of three different interview settings. According to Rapley 
(2007), the use of ICT equipment like videoconference and telephone can limit the collection 
of data material. However, various interview settings had to be used in this research study. 
Moreover, as the results can, not will, be limited by this factor, the influence is not certain. 
Another aspect that needs to be considered with regard to credibility is the challenge of 
portraying the respondents’ statements correctly when translating from Norwegian to English. 
It needs to be recognised that limitations unknown to the researcher might have influenced the 
results credibility as translations from collected data constitute a challenge for the researcher 
(Trochim, 2001). However, as it is not certain that the finding has been influenced, and the 
translation is done to the best of the researchers’ ability, essential information is believed 
preserved. Furthermore, as the findings originate from a qualitative study, which is based on 
the respondents’ subjective understandings of the world, it might entail errors. Yet, Thagaard 
(2003) emphasises that it is always possible to come across biased sources and errors in 
scientific studies, since there is no way of knowing where the respondents’ expertise ends. 
Therefore, the main focus throughout this thesis has been to trust the respondents and believe 
that what they say actually is their individual perception of risk and risk management. Even if 
the respondents’ perception contain errors people’s understanding of risk is the foundation 
they tend to act upon (Slovic 1992a). Therefore the respondents’ statements are believed to 
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contain information of the utmost importance to the research question. Overall, the research 
findings of this study are believed to be credible. 
 
Confirmability: to what extent are the findings confirmable? The methodological aspect 
confirmability refers to the researcher’s ability to be critical of their own interpretations as 
well as the supporting evidence from similar research (Trochim, 2001). Both areas need to be 
discussed in relation to this study. Due to the research area’s novelty no similar studies exist 
on IO and risk perception. As a result, comparisons with previous findings are not possible. 
Even though comparable research findings are missing, the theoretical framework of this 
thesis is founded upon solid findings from psychological research as well as industrial reports 
and studies of integrated operations. The theoretical framework was selected with the 
intention of creating a solid setting for interpreting research findings that might contribute to 
enhance the finding’s confirmability. Additionally, all methodological choices and aspects of 
the research study were thoroughly outlined in an effort to keeping a close eye on the 
development. Mapping out every decision has provided a solid foundation in order to 
critically assess interpretations. Actions like this may, according to Trochim (2001), 
strengthen a research study’s confirmability. Overall, the research findings are considered 
confirmable. 
 
Transferability: to what extent are the research findings transferable? Since transferability 
refers to whether interpretations developed for a specific research project can be relevant in 
another setting (Thagaard, 2003) central elements of this study need to be assessed. To begin 
with sampling should be evaluated. The fact that personnel from the RIO-project helped 
assemble respondents could, on the one hand, be a positive contribution with regard to 
familiarity and knowledge of the sector’s IO development. On the other hand, the manner in 
which the respondents were chosen might have biased the results as the RIO-project’s 
personnel could have contributed to assembling a specific kind of respondent. If so, 
respondents selected independently could differ from those in this study, and potentially 
create other findings. Furthermore, the total number of respondents in general, as well as 
across the four expert groups, is relatively low compared with the total number of people in 
both the sector and the four expert groups. Since it is impossible to know who has been left 
out and what their expertise is, another set of respondents might bring about different results.  
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Next, the quality of the four experts groups should be considered. The fact that each of the 
expert groups covers essential areas of the petroleum sector at the NCS, as well as in relation 
to other oil producing countries, they are seen as a positive contribution. Continuously, 
selecting respondents from various expert groups contributes to capturing the complexity of 
IO in their line of work, such as varying knowledge and expertise. As a result, it can further 
be argued that the expert groups provide meaning beyond the setting of this particular study. 
However, the division of respondents across expert groups may also limit the results as there 
are so few respondents within each expert group. Hence, it is impossible to know if the 
findings of this study correspond with the given expert groups’ typical way of thinking. 
Overall, central elements likely to have influenced this research study make it impossible to 
say anything about the results transferability. Therefore, the findings are considered sufficient 
in order to say anything about the 13 respondents of this study, but insufficient in order to say 
anything about the entire sector. 
5.2 Central aspects and new areas of concern 
Methodologically, the findings are of sufficient quality, although they only provide 
information about the specific respondents of this study. To find out if the results are 
sufficient to answer the research question the implications of the central aspects of the study 
need to be considered. 
 
To begin with, the fact that the findings portray similar IO elements as hazardous and holding 
possibilities imply that IO comprise risks (section 1.4 definition of risk). For instance, the 
findings mentioned that the industry is dependent on a development within ICT in terms of 
growth, which might also create increased system complexity and security issues (section 
4.1.2 and 4.3). However, the positive and negative statements of IO are compatible with the 
expected consequences of IO outlined in the theoretical framework (OLF, 2006b; GEMINI, 
2009). Moreover, the findings indicate that use of the traditional risk definition of EV (table 
3) is a common perception among the respondents. Even though the results are considered too 
inadequate to be applied to the entire sector, the theoretical framework is not. According to 
the theory (section 2.2.1) the traditional EV definition tends to be the overall notion within the 
sector. However, one can speculate whether this traditional definition will be sufficient to 
analyse the interfaces between generation 1 and generation 2 as new and more complex 
systems are introduced by IO. In accordance with the theoretical framework, the findings 
indicate that increased system complexity and industrial challenges in relation to MTO 
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aspects will occur due to IO. Additionally, several of the implied hazards/vulnerabilities that 
the industry might have to face (see table 4), are expected with regard to the transitions of 
generation 1 and generation2. Seeing that the transition between generation 1 and generation 
2 is believed to surface shortly, even though of the time frame of IO is somewhat delayed 
(figure 1), and that IO are expected to increase the complexity of the interfaces between MTO 
(section 2.4.2) the suggested hazards and risk management suggestions (section 4.5.2) may be 
of utmost importance in order to improve and strengthen risk management of IO.  
 
Nevertheless, even though the research findings might provide useful information about 
current beliefs, it is difficult to know exactly how IO will function in the future. Perceptions 
of IO tend to be derived from knowledge about the present system (section 2.1). However, is 
this knowledge sufficient in order to understand how the work process will function in the 
future? Considering the fact that the implementation of IO has begun the petroleum sector 
must believe the answer to the question is yes. If IO are to become a success, the current 
knowledge, ideas and reports need to be correct and functional. Nevertheless, the results 
imply that IO are also doubted, as explicit uncertainty was expressed, and indicated that 
negative psychological effects such as increased or altered risk perception (table 4), might 
arise due to IO. For instance, findings reveal concerns that IO happens too quickly and that 
the purpose of them has not yet been given sufficient attention. What might be the reason for 
this doubt? The fact that no common definition of IO exists (Tveiten et al., 2009) could be 
one reason, as it makes it difficult to conceptualise exactly what IO are and what they 
constitute. Furthermore, the prospect of encountering company dependent terminology and 
different versions of IO (section 2.1.1) might add even more confusion. Overall, as the 
processes of implementing IO occurs at an uneven pace across petroleum companies it is not 
surprising that the respondents perceive IO as chaotic or disorganised, and thus feel 
uncertainty with regard to the implementation and meaning of IO. However, there could be 
other reasons for the respondents concerns about IO. According to Perez-Floriano et al. 
(2007), trust can be an influential factor with regard to risk perception. Therefore, doubts 
concerning whether IO are really safe and have been thoroughly explored may explain why 
the respondents see the risk of IO as so sever. Another explanation could be the perceived 
seriousness of the risk (Renn, 2008). The respondents may be affected or exposed to risk of 
IO to varying extents, and thus perceive hazards/vulnerabilities of IO as more serious than 
they are.  
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The findings further indicate that saying anything about the known or unknown risk aspects of 
IO would only be possible in retrospect, not in advance. These results are alarming and 
confusing, as it tends to be customary for those involved in and affected by the changes of a 
project to have an idea about potential risk aspects prior to implementation. With regard to a 
project with characteristics like IO, it seems especially strange that everybody concerned does 
not know information of this kind. Even if the respondents’ concerns are illegitimate, the 
findings still imply that there is a need for increased information distribution about IO and its 
purpose within the sector. What if, however, the respondents’ concerns are legitimate? It 
seems unlikely that huge projects like IO have been initiated without thorough knowledge 
about what they will lead to. Tveiten et al. (2009) emphasise that some IO knowledge has to 
be gained through practical experience and assessments made throughout individual 
companies. One can further speculate about how much trial and error will be allowed and how 
responsible this is.  
 
According to the PSA no overall IO-regulations exist and the responsibility for IO therefore 
rests upon individual companies (section 5.2.5). Perez-Floriano et al. (2007) emphasise that in 
addition, the government and the company’s federation tend to be responsible for managing 
risk in companies and organisations. If this applies to the implementation and utilization of IO 
in the petroleum industry, it could mean that the different companies do not necessarily have 
full responsibility. But are the different players within the sector aware of their areas of 
responsibility with regard to IO? The prospect of them knowing is relatively large as the PSA 
are in change of making sure they do, and the findings imply that rules and regulations need 
to be adapted in order to fit the challenges and possibilities that IO might impose on the 
industry. However, even though the results imply that use of IO are believed to cause vast 
changes that affect the entire sector, the different aspects of responsibility have been given 
surprisingly little attention by the respondents. One can only speculate as to why, but maybe 
the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the concept functions as a distraction.  
 
Another central aspect is how the findings indicate a decrease in risk when IO are introduced 
because less people will be present on the platforms. This was portrayed as a major argument 
with regard to a reduction in the number of major accidents. This belief is in accordance with 
a lot of the outlined theoretical foundation (section 2.1.3). But are less people exposed to 
danger equivalent with a reduced risk? On the one hand, remote operations will reduce the 
number of offshore personnel meaning less people are exposed to hazards as fewer people are 
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needed on oilrigs (OLF, 2006a; OLF, 2006b; OLF, 2008). Equally, the engineering definition 
of risk, which is the one employed by most of the respondents of this study, uses statistical 
estimations that consider risk on the basis of the number of casualties (Crossland et al., 1992). 
Therefore it could be possible to argue that less people exposed to danger is equivalent with 
risk reduction. On the other hand, it is possible to draw attention to how remote operations 
reduction of offshore personnel fails to mention anything about the conditions for those left 
on the rig. If the risk to the remaining personnel decreases, it is still possible to argue that less 
people exposed to danger is equivalent with risk reduction. However, if IO increases the risk 
to a reduced number of offshore personnel, one can argue that fewer people exposed to danger 
is not necessarily equivalent to risk reduction.  
 
The findings indicate that the consequences of major accidents following IO will stay 
unchanged, apart from with regard to the preceding belief that is also put forward as main 
argument for consequence reduction of major accidents. This fact raises speculations if the 
risk image in relation to IO might be too limited? According to the definition of a major 
accident (section 1.4) environmental effects are just as important as human lives. Moreover, 
consequences and risk reduction in relation to major accidents focuses on damage to/loss of 
human lives, serious environmental damage and loss of financial assets (PSA, 2010e). 
Therefore, it seems peculiar that the findings draw minimum attention to environmental risk 
and one can only speculate in if the findings would have been different had the interviews 
been conducted following the Deepwater Horizon accident. If reducing/eliminating the 
number of people on the platform decrease the risk of environmental damage or loss of 
financial assets, one can argue that less people exposed to danger can be equivalent with risk 
reduction of major accidents. However, if the risk to environmental damage, loss of financial 
assets or the personnel left on the platform increases, one can argue that less people exposed 
to danger is not equivalent with risk reduction of major accidents. A main argument for 
initiating the implementation of IO has been the beneficial effect it would have on risk in 
relation to HSE aspects (section 2.1.3). Perhaps one also believed the risk of major accidents 
would decline. The findings indicate that the risk of this type of accidents happening is 
believed to decrease following the implementation of IO. However,  the preventative efforts 
by remote operations through the control room centre in Huston, Texas, could not prevent the 
Deepwater Horizon accident still occurred. Due to e-drillings vast resemblance to IO at the 
NCS, one can speculate in weather IO will contribute to ease the concern of risk in relation to 
activity at the oil rigs.     
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5.3 Implications for further research  
In view of the fact that no similar study has been conducted it would be interesting to repeat 
the study with both new and more respondents. Although a more extensive qualitative 
interview study would be able to draw more certain conclusion it would be very time 
consuming. Therefore, one suggestion for further research could be to develop wide-ranging 
studies using questionnaires. This way more respondents would be attainable and specific 
selected areas could be investigated in-depth. Some of the central findings from this research 
study could, for instance, be developed further to create a questionnaire that specifically 
focuses on hazards in relation MTO and IO. By using quantitative measures a more detailed 
picture of petroleum personnel’s risk perception of IO at the NCS could be mapped out. As 
the four expert groups cover the main branches of the sector preserving them for further 
research might be prudent; one could choose to focus on one or all of the four expert groups. 
Additionally, including operators would be interesting as they are missing from this study, 
and are those, mainly exposed to risk in relation to petroleum production 
5.4 Overall conclusion 
The main contribution of these research findings is their ability to map out how a few actors 
in the petroleum sector perceive risk and risk management in relation to IO. Great individual 
differences were revealed, both within and across expert groups. Furthermore, the notion that 
risk aspects in relation to IO are perceived most hazardous with regard to advanced generation 
2 development like remote operation and relocation of personnel, might be of major 
importance as the transition from generation 1 to generation 2 is progressing.  
 
Moreover, the results are believed to be of relevance for future resilience27
                                                 
 
 
27 Resilience is the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate 
and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and 
restoration of its essential basic structures and functions (UNISDR, 2009, p. 10). 
 in the sector, as 
numerous risk management suggestions with regard to hazards/vulnerabilities of IO were 
mapped out. These included the likely increase in the complexity of interfaces between man, 
technology and organisation (MTO) and profound risk management challenges of IO, which 
may provide guidance with regard to the development of efficient and resistant tools for risk 
reduction and hazard identification. Additionally, the positive outlooks of IO through 
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expectations and possibilities provide a solid foundation for further work as it reveal a 
glimpse of current awareness across the sector. 
 
Overall, IO seem like a somewhat diffuse and immature area as companies are allowed to 
include whatever they want in them, and a lot of different expertise is needed to make them 
work. Currently one tries to get an overview of IO altering processes and their development. 
However, IO have not yet differentiated with regard to technical computer transfer or 
fundamental construction demands. As a result these areas are still being explored, altered and 
escalated. As the research findings indicate, there is confusion with regard to what IO are. 
Continuing expansion could benefit by creating a more explicit definition of IO so that the 
concept becomes clearer. Alternatively, one could eliminate the concept of IO and use the 
numerous company specific terminologies that flourish instead.  
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Appendix 1 
This is the e-mail that was sent to potential respondents, requesting participation in the 
research study.     
 
 
  
  
 
Appendix 2 
This is the declaration of consent that was applied in the research study.  
 
 
Samtykkeerklæring 
 
Prosjektets formål: Å tilegne seg innsikt i hvordan aktører ved ulike nivå innen 
petroleumsindustrien oppfatter og håndterer risiko relatert til olje produksjon ved integrerte 
opperasjoners miljø. Problemstilling: ”Hvordan persiperes og håndteres risiko av ulike 
ekspertgrupper i relasjon til oljeproduksjon ved et miljø av integrerte opperasjoner?” 
 
Undersøkelsen vil resultere i en masteroppgave i Risikopsykologi, Miljø og 
Samfunnssikkerhet, ved psykologisk institutt, NTNU Dragvoll. Prosjektet skjer i samarbeid 
med avd. for sikkerhet, SINTEF Teknologi og Samfunn, som en del av forskningsprosjektet 
”Interdisciplinary Risk Assessment of Integrated Operations addressing Human and 
Organisational Factors” (RIO). Masteroppgaven vil bli gjort tilgjengelig for prosjektgruppen, 
rette vedkommende ved NTNU, og kan bli publisert på et senere tidspunkt. 
 
Intervjuer med ansatte ved ulike relevante bedrifter/institusjoner i industrien vil bli utført. 
Tilnærming til nevnte tema vil foregå gjennom analyse av intervjuer, og sammenlikning med 
relevant teori.  
 
Intervjuene som blir utført vil kun bli brukt til dette formålet. Det vil bli gjort lydopptak av 
alle intervjuene. Disse opptakene, samt eventuelle transkriberinger, skal kun være tilgjengelig 
for Therese Jenssen Espeland, og vil bli destruert etter at masteroppgaven er ferdig. 
Informantene deltar på frivillig basis og har mulighet til å trekke seg både under og etter 
intervjuet. Sitater og referanser fra intervjuene kan taes med i oppgaven, men informantene 
skal anonymiseres slik at ingen samtaler eller utsagn kan spores tilbake til den enkelte. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
……………….. ..       ………………..        …………………………………………………...       
          Sted                                    Dato                                                  Signatur Informant 
 
 
 
 
 
………………….        ………………..        …………………………………………………… 
            Sted                                 Dato                                                Therese Jenssen Espeland 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix 3 
 
This is the semi-structured interview guide that was used during the interviews. 
 
 
INTERVJUGUIDE 
 
Introduksjon: 
1) Om RIO-prosjektet: 
Min oppgave skrives i samarbeid med et tverrfaglig/ interdisiplinært prosjekt: 
"Interdisciplinary Risk Assessment of Integrated Operations addressing Human and 
Organizational Factors". Prosjektet styres fra avd. for sikkerhet, SINTEF Teknologi 
og Samfunn, og er finansiert av Norges Forskningsråd. 
 
2) Mitt ærend: 
Masteroppgaven skrives innenfor masterretningen Risikopsykologi, Miljø og 
Sikkerhet, ved NTNU, Dragvoll, Psykologisk institutt. Oppgavens tema omhandler 
hvordan risiko oppfattes og håndteres av ulike ekspertgrupper i petroleumsindustrien i 
relasjon til bruken av integrerte operasjoner. Jeg er spesielt interessert i risiko for 
storulykker i forhold til IO. Jeg skal snakke med aktører fra ekspertgrupper som 
risikoanalytikere, konsulenter, myndigheter/tilsyn, industri/næring. 
 
3) Hensikten med intervjuet 
Få innsyn i hvordan aktører fra ulike ekspertgrupper forstår risiko og 
risikohåndtering i relasjon til bruken av integrerte operasjoner i petroleumsbransjen. I 
hvilke grad tenker aktørene på samme måte og hvor varierer forståelsen deres? Jeg vil 
videre spekulere i hva som kan ligge til grunn for de ulike funnene. Jeg kommer til å 
vurdere, analysere og reflektere over respondentenes svar opp mot aktuell teori på 
feltene IO- litteratur og risikopsykologi. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Spørsmål: 
a) Arbeidsområder 
Spm 1: Hvor lenge har du arbeidet ved den bedriften du er ansatt i nå? 
Spm 2: Hvor lenge har du jobbet med de arbeidsoppgavene du har nå? 
Spm 3: Kan du kort fortelle meg om dine arbeidsoppgaver?  
 
b) Integrerte Operasjoner 
Spm 4: Hvilke områder innenfor IO besitter du konkret ekspertise om? 
Spm 5: Hvilke muligheter tror du IO vil bringe med seg? 
Spm 6: Hva er dine forhåpninger om at IO skal kunne utrette? 
 
c) Risiko 
Spm 7: Hvordan vil du definere risiko? 
 
d) Risikopersepsjon av IO  
Med utgangspunkt i din IO ekspertise: 
Spm 8: Hvilke farer tror du kan oppstå ved bruk av IO i industrien? 
• Hvilken fare anser du som størst?  
Spm 9: Hvilke former for sårbarhet tror du IO vil kunne føre til? 
• Hvilke anser du som mest kritisk? 
 
e) Risikopersepsjon av faren for storulykker ved IO 
Spm 10: Hvilke tanker har du om faren for storulykker ved bruk av integrerte             
                     operasjoner? 
Spm 11: I hvilken grad er faren for storulykker ved IO kjent/ ukjent for industrien? 
Spm 12: Hva vil du si er fryktet omfang av en storulykke ved IO? 
Spm 13: Hvor stor tror du sannsynligheten er for at en storulykke vil inntreffe            
         innen IO virksomhet i løpet av den førts ti års perioden i drift? 
 
f) Risikopersepsjon av IKT 
Spm 14: Hvilke tanker gjør du deg om stadig økende krav til fungerende IKT og             
                     faren for storulykker ved IO?   
Spm 15: I hvilken grad mener du det er behov for utvikling av egen IKT spesifikk            
         DFU (definert fare og ulykkeshendelse) som følge av implementeringen av IO? 
  
 
 
g) Risikohåndtering/ Risikostyring ved bruk av IO 
Spm 16: Hvilke utfordringer tror du IO kan bringe med seg for industrien i henhold             
         til risikohåndtreing? 
Spm 17: Hva mener du kan gjøres for å forbedre risikostyring som følge av                       
                     implementering av IO? 
• Hvilke spesifikke tiltak tror du kan iverksettes? 
• Syns du det blir gjort tilstrekkelig? 
 
Avslutnings spørsmål: Er det noe du vil tilføye?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
